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**The  
Electoral System  
for  
Metropolitan  
Toronto**

**Background Report**





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THE ROYAL COMMISSION

ON

METROPOLITAN TORONTO

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

FOR

METROPOLITAN TORONTO

June, 1975



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## PREFACE

This study is one in a series of background reports prepared for The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto, designed to provide the public with an appreciation of Metropolitan Toronto and its government, prior to and during the public hearings. A full listing of the background studies appears on the inside back cover of this document.

Any opinions or views expressed herein are those of the consultants and are not necessarily shared by the Commission.



THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM  
FOR  
METROPOLITAN TORONTO

A description and analysis of the electoral system for Metropolitan Toronto, its constituent municipalities and the local elected and appointed boards and commissions in the Metropolitan Toronto area.

Acknowledgements

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This study was written by T. J. Plunkett, M. J. Powell and P. Milligan, under the general direction of T. J. Plunkett.







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## SUMMARY

This report deals with the electoral system for Metropolitan Toronto. It begins with a brief discussion of how the electoral system has evolved, and examines three main elements of the system: the nature of the governing structure of Metropolitan Toronto, the problems of achieving adequate representation of citizens, and the question of how the voter is affected by the system of elections. The paper concludes with an examination of the major issues and problems arising out of this study of the electoral system.

The electoral system answers four questions that are fundamental to the operation of representative government. Who is eligible to vote? Who is eligible to run for office? What positions will be filled by election? How is the election to be conducted? The history of municipal electoral systems illustrates the gradual extension of the franchise as property restrictions on the vote were abolished, and the corresponding enlargement of the group of people legally entitled to run for office. The number and nature of elective offices in municipal government reflect the influence of American local government, where the practice of holding separate elections for the legislative and executive branches has predominated.

In Metropolitan Toronto, the governing structure includes bodies that are elected directly or indirectly, and other organizations whose members are appointed. Area municipal councils, local boards of education and the Metropolitan Separate School Board, and Hydro or public utilities commissions constitute the directly elected governing bodies. Members of Metropolitan Toronto Council and the Metropolitan Toronto School Board are indirectly elected from among the members of the appropriate locally-elected councils and boards. The local and Metro councils and school boards are responsible for many of the appointments to local and Metro boards, which exercise various municipal powers such as licensing or provide services such as public transportation and public libraries.

Each of the area municipal councils includes a mayor elected at large and councillors elected by wards. In four of the six municipalities, there is also a board of control made up of the mayor and controllers elected at large. Provisions governing these locally-elected offices are set out in provincial legislation which applies to all municipalities throughout Ontario. However, because of different provisions for cities and townships, and because of a certain measure of discretion allowed by the legislation, there are variations in the structure of elective offices in area municipalities. In some cases, these variations are designed to facilitate choosing the municipality's representatives on Metro council, but other differences simply reflect local tradition and preferences.

The executive function - the job of carrying out council policy and supervising the municipal administration - is fulfilled in various ways: by the whole council in East York, by an executive committee of council in Toronto, and by a board of control in the other four municipalities. In every case, the mayor is the chief executive officer; the executive committee or board of control, if one exists, also has statutory powers in the executive arena. Separate elections for mayor and controllers represent an important deviation from the tradition of responsible government that prevails at the provincial and federal levels. Instead of assigning all legislative and executive authority to the council as a whole and having the council choose its executive, Ontario local government is permitted the American tradition of formally separating these functions. It is worth noting that in legislation establishing the regional municipalities in Ontario, provision for the board of control has seldom been made.

Although the position of mayor seems to have become a permanent feature of Canadian municipal government, the board of control system has come under severe criticism on the grounds that it contributes to disharmony within the council. The argument is that it creates a separate power base from which controllers can challenge the mayor and also establishes a body independent of the aldermen yet charged with executing the policies established by the council as a whole.



Metro Council exercises the same powers as an area council, but its jurisdiction is over specific Metro functions as established by provincial legislation. Its members are not directly elected by the voters; instead, each area municipality sends a certain number of its members to sit on Metro Council, with the exact size of their delegation based mainly on population and laid down in the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act. Because the Metro councillors are not directly elected, but are chosen by virtue of being elected to the local council, the voters do not always have a direct voice in Metro affairs. Except where the local position itself guarantees that the incumbent will sit on Metro Council (as in the case of the mayor), individual voters are not able to indicate a preference about which of the local candidates should be given Metro responsibilities.

Like Toronto City Council, Metro Council's executive responsibilities are carried out by an executive committee of council. However, the composition of this committee is not decided by the council as a whole but is established by the Metro Toronto Act. This provision ensures that each area municipality is represented on the executive committee and that representation is roughly proportional to population. The chief executive officer of Metro Council, the Metro Chairman, holds a unique position because he is chosen by the Council either from within its own membership or from without. Although it is often suggested that the chairman should be directly elected, there are persuasive arguments against this both because of the campaign costs of such an election and because having the Council choose the chairman ensures that he enjoys the support of the majority of the Council.

Area boards of education are directly elected by voters according to the ward system for council elections. Unlike municipal councils, however, area boards choose their chairmen from among their own members. The membership of the Metro Toronto School Board is made up of delegates chosen by these local boards in a system that is similar to the composition of Metro Council. The Metro Separate School Board, however, is directly elected by separate school supporters on the basis of special wards throughout the metropolitan community. It is the only body elected on a Metro-wide basis and is constituted in this way because the Metro Separate School Board is the only board of education governing Catholic schools; unlike the Metro public school board, it has no local counterparts.

In four municipalities, voters elect two members of a hydro or public utilities commission in an at-large election held at the same time as council and school board elections. In these municipalities, the mayor is also a member of the commission, bringing its total size to three. The City of Toronto also has a three man commission but its members, apart from the mayor, are appointed by the council and by Ontario Hydro. In the Borough of York, hydro services are provided through a regular department of the municipal administration.

Apart from these elected bodies, there are a great many local and Metro boards and commissions, whose members are appointed by area councils, area boards of education, Metro Council and the Metro school boards. This group of boards and commissions exercises many important functions in local government, and it has often been argued that they fragment local decision making and complicate the co-ordination of local policies and programmes. Furthermore, the number of boards and the variety of services they provide make it difficult for citizens to keep track of them and to assign responsibility to the appropriate quarter.

Because the main goal of the electoral system is to provide the mechanisms through which citizens choose representatives to govern on their behalf, the issue of representation is of major concern. It contains two elements; the idea of equal representation, which involves the principles that all votes should carry equal weight and that all citizens should have equal access to their elected representatives; and the idea of representativeness, which is based on the concept that elected bodies should be representative of the community in order to represent it well.

To achieve equal representation, the usual practice is to ensure that equal population groups have the same number of representatives. In area councils, this means that wards should contain roughly equal populations. When the Ontario Municipal Board draws up the ward boundaries, equality of population is the main principle it applies. However, there are various other concerns that must be taken into account. One is the fact that different areas have different growth potential; unless ward sizes are soon

to become unequal, the boundaries must be drawn with future growth in mind. Another consideration is to keep communities of interest intact so that their voting strength is not dispersed among various wards. This is particularly important when neighbourhoods face redevelopment, when ethnic communities have special needs and interests, and when small municipalities are being amalgamated or absorbed by larger ones. In all these cases, the community of interest should be maintained as a voting unit or within a single voting unit, so that its collective voice can be heard.

The same sorts of concerns apply to the Metro-level government. The basic principle is that representation should be based on population. However, the fact that Metro councillors are chosen from local councils, rather than by direct election, means that representation is based on population within the context of existing area municipal units. The allocation of representatives to Metro Council must ensure that all municipalities retain a basic delegation to Metro so that they are, as communities, represented. Thus, when representation is being redistributed because of changing populations within Metro, the existing representation for smaller municipalities is one of the constraints on strict representation by population. Another issue is raised by the fact that all Metro councillors are also local councillors and must combine the two sets of responsibilities. Because local responsibilities differ from one municipality to the next, the time available for Metro duties will also vary. This imbalance will affect the presumed equality (based on population) of representation among the Metro councillors.

The issue of representativeness raises the question of how well the electoral system can provide for a range of candidates that reflect the range of occupations, incomes, ethnic backgrounds, etc., in the community. Although the voters will make the final decision about the composition of the council, it is important to ensure that they can choose from a full range of potential candidates. The legal qualifications for candidacy do permit this, but there are political, social, and personal restrictions on representativeness. Among the most important are issues of job security, skills and training, and the costs of running for public office. Not all those legally entitled to run for office can afford to do so,



either in simple financial terms, or in terms of their future job security. Many people cannot afford to leave their jobs to serve on council because of the difficulty they would have returning to their private occupations afterwards. This consideration tends to introduce an occupational bias to municipal councils, in favour of those who can maintain some connection with their private jobs while in office or return to them easily when their term is up.

Even among those who are able to consider serving in municipal government, the questions of workload and pay will affect their decision to run. Although the workload is not uniform for all local offices and accurate estimates are difficult to obtain, it is reasonable to assume that some potential candidates disqualify themselves because they cannot keep up with their private responsibilities and do an adequate job in public office. Similarly, some citizens may be prevented from running for office because the remuneration is not sufficient to compensate them for the work they do and for the opportunities they forego or the later job costs they incur. These factors will all affect how well the range of candidates reflects the range of interests within the community. To the extent that they introduce any systematic bias in favour of one group and against another, they undermine the council's potential to be fully representative of the community.

From the point of view of the voter, the municipal electoral system presents a difficult and unwieldy collection of choices. In every municipal election, the voter is entitled to make between five and eleven voting decisions. If these are to be balanced and considered judgements, the voter must inform himself about a wide range of issues and candidates. Local government is not run on the basis of party politics or other organizing principle that aids the voter in identifying who the candidates are and where they stand on certain issues, but it nevertheless offers the voter far more voting decisions than federal or provincial elections. In the face of this bewildering array, many eligible voters do not vote or do not cast all the votes to which they are entitled.



The confusion of municipal elections may in part account for the low voter turnout at local elections. However, it has also been argued that only 30% of the electors bother to vote because most are not interested in what local government does or because most feel that there are no genuine policy decisions to be made. To some degree, voter interest (and hence turnout) will reflect the extent to which the municipality is faced with difficult decisions on matters within its jurisdiction. For example, local government has considerable responsibility for zoning and land use, and for transportation; thus in municipalities where the key decisions are being made on these issues, interest in local politics is likely to be greater.

Many issues arise out of a consideration of the electoral system. Among them are concerns about the proliferation of elected and appointed positions, which makes co-ordination within local government more difficult, complicates the voters' choice, and obscures the lines of responsibility for decisions. The indirect election of Metro Council raises the questions of whether the voters have an adequate opportunity to express their preferences on Metro issues and of how well an elected representative can combine local and Metro responsibilities. The short term of office and the financial and occupational costs of running for office pose the issue of whether local councils can be sufficiently representative of the community. Furthermore, the general complexity of municipal government in the Metropolitan area makes it difficult for all those concerned, the electors and the elected, to fulfill their responsibilities adequately.



## INTRODUCTION

The electoral system is an essential part of the structure of representative government. The meaning of 'representative government' is that citizens, instead of governing directly, delegate their decision-making powers to a group of people they have chosen to represent them. Once this group has been given power by the citizens, it then governs on their behalf. The process of delegating power, of choosing representatives to govern for us, is what the electoral system is designed to accomplish.

In general, the electoral system answers four important questions. Who is eligible to vote? What positions are to be filled by election? Who is eligible to run for office? How is the election to be conducted? At first glance, these questions might seem commonplace or obvious, but the history of electoral politics makes it clear that each of them has been the subject of considerable controversy.

The question of who is eligible to vote has been the most contentious. Throughout the development of representative government, the franchise (i.e., the right to vote) has been extended to include more of the population, but the extensions were granted only after long debate. The case of the women's vote is a good example. The women's suffrage movement began in Canada in 1870's but women were not granted the right to vote in federal elections until 1918, almost fifty years after their campaign had begun. The enfranchisement of women for provincial elections varied across the country. Although most provinces gave women the right to vote during the war years (1914-1918), Quebec women did not get the vote until 1943.

Like the right to vote in federal and provincial elections, the right to vote in municipal elections has been extended over the years. Because municipal government has always been supported by the property tax, the right to vote in municipal elections has been subject to property qualifications. The argument was that those who bore the burden of taxation (i.e., the property owners) ought to have the right to choose the government. One turn-of-the-century student of local government explained that

..throughout Canada, the municipality is regarded more as a species of joint stock company, (with) only those contributing capital being allowed to share in the direction of affairs.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, in the 1880's, women who owned property could vote in the municipal elections, but not in provincial or federal elections. At the same time, men who did not own property could not vote in municipal elections, but were entitled to vote in the others.

For many years, property qualifications restricted the municipal vote in Ontario to owners or tenants<sup>2</sup> of property over a certain value. The value levels established for the vote are low in present-day terms; in towns over 3,000 population, the amount was \$300 and in cities, \$400. Only householders (and their spouses) having property assessed for this amount were entitled to vote. Other municipal residents - including lodgers - were not. This property qualification also meant that people who owned or rented property in a municipality, even if they did not live there, were entitled to vote in its elections.

These provisions applied to all the municipalities in Ontario, because voter eligibility at municipal elections is set out in provincial legislation. Therefore, any changes in the municipal franchise have had to be initiated by a change in the relevant provincial statute. Removal of the property restrictions on the vote could only take place in Ontario after the provincial government passed the Municipal Franchise Extension Act in 1958. This Act by itself did not extend the right to vote, but it did allow the municipalities to put the question to the voters. If they approved, the vote was granted to all those who were residents of the municipality, British subjects, and at least 21 years old.<sup>3</sup> This extension, and other

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1. F. Morely Wickett, "City Government in Canada" University of Toronto Studies in History and Economics, Vol. II (1970) p. 10
  2. According to provincial legislation, the vote was given only to householders; ie., those people who owned or rented a self-contained dwelling unit.
  3. At the 1958 Municipal elections, Toronto voters did grant this extension of the franchise, as did most of the municipalities within Metro. However the extension did not come into effect in Scarborough, Swansea, and Weston until the mid-1960's.



changes in the franchise like the 1971 provision granting the vote to those between 18 and 21, have all been incorporated in the Municipal Elections Act of 1972. The provisions governing voter eligibility are now uniform across the province. The 1972 Act specifies that any person is entitled to vote in a municipal election if he is not disqualified by provincial legislation and if, at the time of enumeration, he meets the following qualifications

- a) resident in the municipality
- b) a Canadian citizen or other British subject; and
- c) of the full age of eighteen years.

Despite recent changes in the voter eligibility laws, some ties to the property qualification remain in Ontario. Although no one is disenfranchised for property reasons, some non-residents are allowed to vote - if they own or rent property in the municipality and are otherwise eligible. It is also possible for corporations that own or rent property to nominate an eligible voter to vote on the corporation's behalf. The property qualification is more clearly seen in the provisions governing a general vote on a money by-law. If the voters are asked to approve or disapprove of a proposition that involves borrowing money, only certain citizens are allowed to vote: those people (or corporations) who own property or rent property under a lease that is as long as the period of debt involved.<sup>1</sup> This provision is based on the argument that the debt will be repaid with property tax revenues and that owners and tenants with a long-term interest in their property are the ones who should decide the load of debt it must support. However, this situation only arises in the relatively uncommon event that the money by-law is put before the electorate. The usual practice nowadays is for the municipal council to apply to the Ontario Municipal Board for permission to borrow, rather than to ask the voters.

Although voter eligibility is uniform throughout the province, there is some variation among municipalities concerning what positions are to be filled by election. All municipalities have an elected council and a mayor or reeve, but the size of the council can vary within certain limits. There is an elected board of education, but its size can vary. Some municipalities have hydro commissions or public utilities commissions with a majority of the commissioners elected at large.

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1. The lease must be for the length of debt repayment or at least 21 years.

In other municipalities, the hydro commission members are appointed or, instead of a commission, there is a committee of council to oversee local hydro operations.

The number and variety of elected positions at the municipal level is one of the striking differences between the local government and the system of government at the federal and provincial levels. Although in the elections for senior levels of government, each elector casts only one vote, the same elector may make as many as ten or eleven voting choices in a municipal election. This difference reflects the difference between the British and American approaches to government. British tradition calls for a generally elected assembly which embodies all legislative and executive power. American government, on the other hand, is based on separate elections for legislative and executive office, so that each may act as a check on the other. The federal and provincial governments in Canada are based on the British model, but 'Canadian municipal practice in this respect has generally followed the United States practice rather than the British'.<sup>1</sup> The significance of this pattern will be discussed later in the study.

The question of who is eligible to run for office usually reflects the provisions for voter eligibility; that is, whoever is eligible to vote is eligible to run for office. In some cases, there has been a time lag between voter eligibility and the right to run for office. For example, the Municipal Franchise Extension Act of 1958 opened the way for lodgers to be given the vote, but it was not until 1972 that they were allowed to stand for office. Except for discrepancies of this sort, all those eligible to vote are eligible to run for office unless they are specifically disqualified by provincial legislation.

Certain people are disqualified from holding municipal office because of their occupations. For example, judges, members of the Legislative Assembly, Senators, and MPs are all ineligible. Employees of the municipality or a local board are not entitled to run for office unless they take a leave of absence from their jobs. In general, these people are disqualified because of the incompatibility between their own jobs and serving on council; they cannot do both adequately and fairly. In the case of municipal employees, there used to be a total ban on their standing for office

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1. H. L. Brittain, Local Government in Canada, Toronto, Ryerson Press, (1951) p. 14.

because of the conflict of interest involved in being an employee of the municipal corporation and a member of its governing council. However, the 1972 Municipal Elections Act provides that employees can request a leave of absence to run for office and requires that they resign if they are elected.

The fourth question answered by the electoral system is how the election is to be conducted. Provincial legislation lays out the procedures governing a great many matters: nominations, the list of eligible voters, polling subdivisions and polling places, the hours of the voting, voting by proxy, and so on. Most of these arrangements have become routine but the difficult task of running an election can still present many problems. Disputes about the validity of an election are handled by the courts; if any impropriety is found to have existed during the election, the court can order the result set aside and a new election held.

Normally, however, elections take place without any improper actions. Much of this has been attributed to the decision to institute the secret ballot and, to a lesser extent, the prohibition of the sale of alcohol on election day. Before these regulations were put into effect, there were widespread abuses of the electoral system. Candidates or their supporters bought votes with drinks or intimidated the voters by threats of what would happen (or not happen) if the voter made the 'wrong' choice. Though we may assume that those days are long gone, we cannot underestimate the importance of the secret ballot in allowing voters the freedom of choice to which they are legally entitled.

This brief account of what the electoral system does should provide some of the background material for the consideration of Metro Toronto that follows. Although the electoral systems in Metro Toronto, as in other municipalities, are closely specified by provincial legislation, they face particular problems because of the Metropolitan Federation. Unlike other municipalities, Metropolitan Toronto and its constituent municipalities are tied together in a unique legislative and political arrangement. Whether the electoral system can provide a satisfactory basis for this arrangement is one of the important questions facing citizens and their elected representatives.




# SECTION 1: ELECTIVE OFFICES IN METROPOLITAN TORONTO

## A) INTRODUCTION: The Governing Structure of Metropolitan Toronto

The government of the Metropolitan community is a complex structure or, more accurately, a complex set of interrelated structures. Figure 1 below attempts to summarise the main bodies and relationships involved.

Figure 1: GOVERNING STRUCTURE OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO





The basic elements in the set are the local bodies directly elected by the voters of each municipality: the city and borough councils, the area boards of education, and, in four municipalities, the hydro or public utilities commissions. All of the other elements of government in the metropolitan area are derived from these directly elected local bodies, with the single exception of the Metropolitan Toronto Separate School Board, which is elected by separate school supporters throughout Metro.

Membership on the Metropolitan Toronto Council is established through a process of indirect election; that is, members of Metro Council are chosen by virtue of their election to one of the area councils. Similarly, the membership of the Metropolitan Toronto School Board is drawn from among the locally elected members of the area boards of education and the elected members of the Metro Separate School Board. Apart from bodies that are directly or indirectly elected, there are various boards and commissions at the local and metropolitan levels. Members of these boards and commissions are appointed rather than elected; and in many cases, those appointed are chosen from among the private citizens of the Metro community.

This sketch of the governing structure of Metro points to the main structures and relationships that are involved. It is within this general framework that the electoral system must be considered.

## B) COUNCILS OF THE AREA MUNICIPALITIES

### 1. Background

The most prominent elected body in the municipalities is the city or borough council. All six of the constituent municipalities of Metro follow the common local pattern of the mayor and council form of government. There are, however, some important differences among these councils. In general, these differences can be accounted for in one of three ways: variations in the provincial legislation governing

different types of municipalities; the distinct political needs and political history of the municipalities; and the municipality's position within the metropolitan federation.

Provincial legislation identifies various types of municipalities: the city, town within a county, town in an unorganised territory, township, village, and police village. Only the city and township are of direct relevance to Metro. The City of Toronto is, of course, a city and is therefore subject to all the provisions affecting cities in the Ontario Municipal Act as well as to the special provisions in the City of Toronto Act. The five boroughs are all defined as townships for the purposes of provincial legislation; the term 'borough' rarely occurs in the statutes. Thus, where the provisions for cities and townships differ, the City of Toronto will follow one set and the boroughs will follow another. These differences occur in the general legislative directions about such matters as the number of ward representatives and the establishment and size of boards of control.

Within the structure of provincial legislation, there is some choice allowed to the municipalities about the size and organisation of the council. This has given them a measure of discretion in developing their government in a way appropriate to local needs and wishes. When some area municipalities were amalgamated in 1967, various discretionary differences were continued. For example, the Township of Etobicoke had four 2-member wards; it was amalgamated with Long Branch, Mimico, and New Toronto, where council elections were not based on wards. Although the new Borough of Etobicoke might have gone to a system of single-member wards, it retained the 2-member wards that were already familiar to a large proportion of the borough's voters.

The question of representation on Metro Council has also influenced local government organisation. York, for example, sends three members to Metro Council. When the Borough of York was created in 1967, its council was composed of eight aldermen, each elected from a separate ward. Provincial legislation provides that when there are fewer than ten aldermen, the Board of Control (if there is one) shall be made up of the mayor and two controllers elected at large. York chose to have this

3-member Board of Control, which both provides an executive body for the council, and serves as York's delegation to Metro Council. Similarly, the City of Toronto has a system of eleven two-member wards that was chosen partly because it simplified the selection of Toronto's twelve representatives to Metro Council (i.e., the mayor and the senior alderman from each ward).

## 2. Basic Council Organisation

In the six municipalities, the mayor is elected at large, as the provincial legislation dictates. Other members of council are elected in one of two ways: as ward representatives or as controllers elected at large. The number and size of wards in each municipality is established by the Ontario Municipal Board, but once the number of wards is decided, the question of how many representatives each ward will have is decided either by provincial legislation or by the council.<sup>1</sup>

The legislation for cities provides that each ward shall elect three aldermen or that the council may, by by-law, choose to have only two aldermen from each ward.<sup>2</sup> It is the 2-representative ward system that the City of Toronto has chosen. For boroughs, the provisions are slightly different. If there are more than six wards in the municipality, then each ward elects one representative. But if there are five wards or fewer, each elects two representatives. Thus East York and Etobicoke, with four and five wards respectively, elect two aldermen from each ward. The other three boroughs all have single member wards since their number of wards is greater than six (York - 8; Scarborough - 12; North York - 14).

The size of the council may be augmented by the election of controllers. In the case of cities over 100,000 population, a Board of Control is mandatory unless the council votes by a two-thirds majority not to have one.<sup>3</sup>

- 
1. See Section 2B p. 36 for information on the creation of wards.
  2. See Legislative Tables appended.
  3. This general rule has not applied in Toronto: See following section.



The creation of a Board of Control is optional in the boroughs. Provincial legislation provides that a township with a population of over 100,000 can choose by a two-thirds vote of council to have a Board of Control.<sup>1</sup> If the borough chooses a Board of Control, its size is determined by the number of aldermen on council. If there are ten or more aldermen, the Board of Control is made up of the mayor and four controllers elected at large: in cases of fewer than ten aldermen, the mayor and two controllers elected at large form the Board of Control. Within Metro, the Borough of East York has chosen not to have a Board of Control,<sup>2</sup> but the other four boroughs have all chosen in favour of such a body.

Tables 1 and 2 summarise the size, composition, and basis of election for area councils. Both the tables and the preceding discussion indicate that there is considerable variation among local councils. As we have pointed out in an earlier discussion, the variation is attributable to differences within the provincial legislation, local choice, and Metro considerations.

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1. See Legislative Tables appended.

2. The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act contains a special provision stating that the Borough of East York, for the purposes of provincial legislation governing boards of control, shall be considered a township of not less than 100,000 population; see S. 149 (2). This provision ensured that East York would have the power to establish a board of control even if, as in 1967, its population was slightly less than 100,000. However, the Borough has not chosen to exercise this power.



TABLE 1: SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF ELECTED COUNCILS

<u>Municipality</u>	<u>Size of Council</u>	<u>Mayor</u>	<u>Controllers</u>	<u>Councillors</u>
City of Toronto	23	1	-	22
East York	9	1	-	8
Etobicoke	15	1	4	10
North York	19	1	4	14
Scarborough	17	1	4	12
York	11	1	2	8

TABLE 2: BASIS OF ELECTION

<u>Municipality</u>	<u>Mayor</u>	<u>Controllers</u>	<u>Councillors</u>
City of Toronto	at large	-	2 from each of 11 wards
East York	at large	-	2 from each of 4 wards
Etobicoke	at large	at large	2 from each of 5 wards
North York	at large	at large	1 from each of 14 wards
Scarborough	at large	at large	1 from each of 12 wards
York	at large	at large	1 from each of 8 wards

### 3. The Executive Function

The municipal council, as a whole, is the legislative body of the municipality. It is empowered to pass by-laws that authorise a wide range of services and regulate many activities. But in addition to its legislative powers, the municipal council has executive responsibilities; that is, the general administration of municipal business, supervision of civic departments, and the execution of policies that it has established.<sup>1</sup> The mayor is the chief executive officer of the municipality, and has a rather vaguely-defined responsibility to see that the executive function is carried out properly. In some cases, the mayor and the entire council fulfil both the legislative and executive functions. But more often the practice is to have a group smaller than the full council carry out the executive responsibilities. Such a group can be constituted in two ways: as an executive committee of council composed of the mayor and a number of aldermen chosen by the council, or as a Board of Control made up of the mayor and controllers elected at large.

Within Metro's municipalities, all three types of executive organisation are to be found. The Borough of East York does not have a separate executive body; the council as a whole carries out the executive function. It is assisted by a larger than usual number of standing committees. East York has a total of eight operating and regulatory committees, compared to the average of four in other municipalities. Through its committee system and because of its small council (9 members), East York has organised its affairs without a formally designated executive body. The other four boroughs all have a Board of Control whose members are elected at large. Except in York, where the Board is made up of the mayor and two controllers, those boroughs have a 5-member Board of Control. The third system, the Executive Committee of council, exists only in the City of Toronto. This committee is made up of the mayor and four aldermen, chosen by council from among the senior aldermen from each ward. Both the Boards of Control and

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1. See The Organisation of Local Government in Metropolitan Toronto The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto, 1975. p. 39.

the Executive Committee exercise the executive powers granted to them by provincial legislation. The council cannot overrule a decision made by such a body except by a two-thirds majority vote. Table 3 summarises the executive bodies in area municipalities.

The organisation of the executive function is one of the key characteristics differentiating the British and American traditions of government.<sup>1</sup> The parliamentary tradition followed in Britain and in Canadian federal and provincial government is not only representative government but also responsible government. In this context, the term 'responsible government' means that the executive is responsible to the legislative assembly for its actions. The executive body, including the chief executive officer, is chosen by the legislature from among its general membership. The executive must account for its actions to the legislature, in the same way that the legislature is accountable to the voters. This tradition puts a premium on consensus among branches of government: because the executive is chosen by, and is responsible to, the general legislature, there must be substantial agreement between the executive and a majority of the members of the legislative body. In order to remain in power, the executive must have the support of the legislature. According to the canons of responsible government, the only popularly elected representatives are the members of the legislative body; neither the chief executive (mayor) nor other executive officers would be chosen by direct election. The City of Toronto followed this practice until the mid-nineteenth century, when it experimented with the separate election of the mayor. After a brief return to having the mayor chosen by the council, the City established the at-large election of the mayor in 1873.

Although the position of mayor is still filled by direct election, the City of Toronto moved closer to the responsible government tradition in 1969, when the council asked the province to enact legislation dissolving its Board of Control and replacing it with an Executive Committee.<sup>2</sup> The council as a whole chooses

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1. British local government adheres closely to the responsible government tradition. The local councillors are the only elected representatives. The council as a whole chooses its executive and chief executive officer, and it may also appoint private citizens to the council. Thus the London County Council has 100 councillors (elected) and 16 aldermen (appointed by the councillors).
  2. Although the Municipal Act allows cities to dissolve a Board of Control by a two-thirds vote of council, the legislative change was required to give the Executive Committee the same statutory powers as a Board of Control.

TABLE 3: COUNCILS' EXECUTIVE BODIES

<u>Municipality</u>	<u>Form of Executive</u>	<u>No. of Members</u>	<u>Composition and Selection</u>
City of Toronto	Executive Committee	5	Mayor and 4 Aldermen Chosen by Council from among senior ward aldermen
East York	-	-	-
Etobicoke	Board of Control	5	Mayor and 4 elected Controllers
North York	Board of Control	5	Mayor and 4 Controllers
Scarborough	Board of Control	5	Mayor and 4 Controllers
York	Board of Control	3	Mayor and 2 Controllers



four of the members of the Executive Committee from among the senior ward aldermen; these four, along with the mayor, then exercise the executive function. This practice is a general assurance that the executive body will reflect the prevailing views among the council.

The independent offices of mayor and controller do not belong to the tradition of responsible government, but rather reflect the separation of powers tradition that underlies American government. Separate elections and separate grants of power are common in U.S. government, where the predominant philosophy has been that one branch of government, being independent of another, will act as a check on its power and will assure just and equitable government. Although it drew its basic justification from this tradition, the structure of American local government was also heavily influenced by the emphasis on 'sound administrative procedures' typical of private business organisations. The origin of the Board of Control system in U.S. local government was in keeping with the concerns of separation of power and good business practices.<sup>1</sup> The existence of the mayor's position and the Board of Control system in Canada can be attributed to the popularity in this country of the American approach to local government organization.

Although the separate office of mayor is a standard feature of Canadian municipal government, the Board of Control is used only in Ontario. It provides voters with an opportunity to elect the council's executive officers directly, but it also opens up the possibility of institutionalised conflict between the controllers and the mayor and between the Board of Control and the rest of council. Because the mayor and the controllers are elected at large, all of them have an equivalent political base. It is far easier for a controller to challenge the mayor's position than it is for a ward representative. Therefore, there is the possibility of political competition between the controllers and the mayor that may not always benefit the municipality. A further problem is that, although the Board of Control is charged with

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1. In many cases, however, the board of control system was a device used to ensure that immigrant groups, which were a powerful force in ward politics, did not gain control of civic administration. It is interesting to note that a board of control was established in some U. S. cities in the latter part of the 19th Century as an experiment advocated by municipal reformers and was adopted by the City of Toronto just before the end of the century. By the early part of the twentieth century, the American experiments with a board of control were abandoned.

executing council policy and with guiding the local administration, there may be little agreement between the Board of Control and the rest of council. Because controllers are elected independently and from a wider constituency than aldermen, there is no necessary basis for agreement between the two groups. Although Boards of Control may well have served Ontario municipalities successfully, criticisms along the lines indicated above are common, and usually stem from the attachment to the responsible government tradition in Canada.

### C. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT

#### 1. Background

The metropolitan federation is based on the joint operations of area municipalities and the metropolitan municipality. The arrangement is similar in some respects to the federal system in Canada. Like provincial governments, the area municipalities have control of various functions within their own boundaries. The metropolitan municipality, like the federal government, has jurisdiction over the entire metropolitan area but only with respect to certain other functions. In some cases, matters are conducted through intergovernmental (area-metro) co-operation or joint jurisdiction.<sup>1</sup>

The analogy between the metro federation and the federal system of Canada is not perfect. One of the most significant differences has to do with the electoral system. The provincial and federal governments are both directly elected. However, in Metro Toronto, only area governments are directly elected. Metro Council (the federal level) is made up of representatives directly elected to area councils. This unique feature of metropolitan government is, in several ways, its most important characteristic.

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1. See The Organization of Local Government in Metropolitan Toronto, The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto, 1975. pp. 28-31.

## 2. Metropolitan Toronto Council

Metro Council has the same legal powers as the area municipal councils, but it exercises those powers over a different range of functions. Unlike area municipal councils, Metro council is indirectly elected, its members are chosen from among those elected to the area councils. The membership of Metro Council is set out in The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act. This Act establishes the number of representatives that each municipality shall have and also provides some specific instruction about how these representatives are selected.<sup>1</sup>

The number of representatives from each municipality is determined by population, and as the population balance shifts, the composition of Metro Council changes. Representation was revised at the beginning of 1975 so that the increase of population in North York and Scarborough would be reflected in the Metro representation.

Although the size of each municipality's delegation to Metro can be established quite easily, the composition of the delegation is more complicated. There are three methods of determining the membership of a Metro delegation.

- a) entirely by elected position. In Etobicoke and York, representation on Metro Council is determined entirely by the local elections for mayor and controllers. All those, and only those, who win these positions become Metro councillors.
- b) by elected position and size of electoral victory. From Toronto, the members of Metro Council are the mayor, chosen by virtue of his election to that position, and the senior alderman from each ward, chosen because they received the greatest number of votes in their election.

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1. However, the Act is silent on whether or not the representatives from the area municipalities must act in accordance with area council policy in their voting on Metro Council.



- c) by elected position and council choice. In East York, North York, and Scarborough, representatives are chosen by elected position (i.e., the mayor from East York, and the mayor and four controllers from North York and Scarborough) and by the council. The number of aldermen required to complete the representation to which the municipality is entitled are chosen by council.

Table 4 illustrates the size and composition of area council representation on Metro Council. The rather complicated provisions governing the membership of Metro Council raise some important electoral issues. Except in case a) above, the voter cannot have full knowledge at the time of the election whether the ballot he or she casts is for a local councillor or for a local and Metro councillor. Where representatives to Metro Council are chosen by the size of their electoral victory or by the area council, the individual voter cannot exercise a choice about who shall go to Metro Council. Take the example of the Toronto aldermanic elections. Each voter is allowed two choices. It may be that neither of the voter's choices will win the election, but the voter has nonetheless voiced his opinion. But perhaps both candidates do win; one of them will sit on the city council and on the Metro Council, but the individual voter has not been able to indicate a preference as to which of them it shall be. The collective electorate has favoured one candidate more than any of the others for the election to city council but no individual voter has been able to choose a candidate who will assume Metro responsibilities.

This situation is similar, but only superficially, to a federal or provincial election where the voter casts a ballot for a member who may or may not become a Cabinet minister. The voter cannot choose candidates for Cabinet directly. But a Cabinet, unlike Metro Council, is an executive body responsible to the assembly for which the elector was entitled to vote. Metro Council, on the other hand, is a legislative body in its own right, and is responsible for a wide range



TABLE 4: LOCAL REPRESENTATION ON METRO COUNCIL<sup>1)</sup>

<u>Municipalities</u>	<u>No. of Members on Metro Council</u>	<u>Composition of Metro Delegation</u>
Toronto	12	Mayor and Senior Alderman from each of 11 wards.
East York	2	Mayor and one Alderman chosen by council.
Etobicoke	5	Mayor and four Controllers elected at large.
North York	9	Mayor, four Controllers elected at large, and four Aldermen chosen by council.
Scarborough	6	Mayor, four Controllers elected at large, and one Alderman chosen by council.
York	3	Mayor and two Controllers elected at large.

1) Based on the revised composition of Metro Council that came into effect on 1 January, 1975

of functions not subject to scrutiny or control by the local councils. The difficulty with the indirect elections to Metro Council is that in many cases (i.e., all those not chosen entirely by the position to which they were elected) the voter's local choice becomes a Metro choice without the voter's direct approval.

This uncertainty can have the effect of reducing pre-election discussion and debate on Metro issues. Because candidates running for office cannot always be clearly identified beforehand as purely local candidates or as local/Metro candidates, campaigns tend to be based on local issues. This has two effects: it reduces the voter's ability to exercise a choice regarding Metro government when voting for the mayor or controllers, and it obscures the fact that the voter, whether aware of it or not, has an indirect electoral input into the composition of Metro council.

### 3. Metro Council Executive

Like the City of Toronto, Metro Council has an Executive Committee that exercises the statutory authority of a Board of Control. However, this Executive Committee is not chosen by the larger membership of Metro Council. The composition of the committee is set out in the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act. As with membership on Metro Council, membership on the executive committee is determined by elected position, size of electoral victory or area council choice. Table 5 outlines the size of each municipality's representation on Metro executive and how the members are chosen.

Although the Executive Committee in Toronto is based on the responsible government tradition, this is not entirely true of Metro's Executive Committee. Nevertheless, Metro Executive is not divorced from the concept of responsibility. It is true that the council as a whole cannot choose the executive, but members of the executive are drawn from among the members of Metro Council. The emphasis in Metro executive is on maintaining the balance of local representation as well as ensuring some measure of responsibility to Metro Council. Thus, if the council as a whole were to choose the executive, some municipalities - particularly the small boroughs of York and East York which have between them only five of

TABLE 5: LOCAL REPRESENTATION ON METRO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 1)

<u>Municipality</u>	<u>Number of Representatives</u>	<u>Local Council Position</u>
City of Toronto	4	Mayor; 3 members of city executive committee chosen by council
East York	1	Mayor
Etobicoke	2	Mayor; Controller receiving the most votes in election
North York	3	Mayor; 2 Controllers receiving the most votes
Scarborough	2	Mayor; Controller receiving the most votes
York	1	Mayor
<hr/>		
Total	13	

1) Full Metro Executive Committee includes the Metro Chairman, bringing total membership to 14.

the thirty-seven area representatives - might end up with no voice in the executive control of Metro affairs. On the other hand, because members of the executive are drawn from among the Metro councillors and constitute more than one-third of the total membership, some measure of agreement between Executive and Council is assured.

Apart from the area representatives on Metro Council, there is also the Metro Chairman. This person is freely chosen by the Council, either from within their own membership or from outside it. The position of Metro Chairman is unique; as chief executive officer, he is the only member of the Metropolitan government whose sole responsibilities are to the Metropolitan Municipality. Although there has been considerable discussion about the possibility of the direct, Metro-wide election of the Chairman, many arguments have been made against direct election and in favour of the present system. Perhaps the most common argument against direct election is that the costs to the candidates of running a Metro-wide campaign would be enormous. Access to campaign funds would become a crucial qualification for potential candidates. But it has also been argued that the present system has the positive advantage of ensuring that the Chairman is acceptable to a majority of Metro Council. Given the dual loyalties of all other members of Metro Council, their agreement on so important a person as Metro Chairman may be one of the keystones to the effective functioning of Metro Council. Choosing the Chairman is not merely the Council's first collective action, it is also the beginning of a pattern of co-operation and agreement that is critical to the success of Metro government.

#### D) SCHOOL BOARDS

##### 1. Background

In addition to the directly elected municipal councils, there are also area boards of education whose members are directly elected. These boards are in charge of education within the area municipalities. While their powers and functions are determined by pro-



vincial legislation, the boards of education are completely autonomous insofar as the area municipal councils are concerned. Within education, however, there is a federated structure parallel to Metro Council. The Metro Toronto School Board, like Metro Council, is indirectly elected from the membership of the area boards. There is a third structure in education that has no counterpart in the multi-purpose Metro government: the Metro Separate School Board. This body alone among the governmental structures in the metropolitan community is elected directly on a Metro-wide basis.

All the school boards, area or Metro, public or separate, are governed by provincial legislation. Where direct elections are held, these are prescribed by several provincial statutes: the Municipal Elections Act, the Secondary Schools and Boards of Education Act, and the Metro Toronto Separate School Board Act.<sup>1</sup> Provisions governing the indirect elections to Metro School Board are contained in the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act.

## 2. Area Boards of Education

Each municipality has its own area board of education. Elections to this body follow almost exactly the same pattern as aldermanic elections in the municipality. The wards are the same and the same number of representatives are elected from each ward. There are, however, several differences between council elections and board of education elections. The mayor of the municipal council is elected at large, but the chairman of the board of education is chosen by, and from among, the general membership of the board. Similarly, there is no separately elected body to fulfil the executive function. The job of executing Board policy and overseeing the activities of Board employees is assumed by the Board of Education as a whole.

A further difference is that some representatives to the area boards (e.g. three out of twenty-five in Toronto) are elected by separate school electors in

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1. See Legislative Tables appended for exact provisions.

TABLE 6: SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS IN METRO

Municipality	Area Boards of Education			Metro Separate School Board
	elected by public school supporters	elected by separate school supporters	Total	No. elected by separate school supporters in each municipality
City of Toronto	22	3	25	9
East York	8	2	10	1
Etobicoke	10	2	12	3
North York	14	2	16	4
Scarborough	12	2	14	3
York	8	2	10	1
				Total 21

specially-devised wards. In each case, these wards are combinations of two or more regular municipal wards. The children of separate school supporters attend public schools for the last three years of secondary school and it is for this reason the separate school supporters elect a small number of representatives to the area public boards of education. These separate school representatives vote only on matters concerning secondary schools, where the interests of their constituents might be affected. Table 6 provides a breakdown of the public and separate school representatives on each area board.

### 3. Metro Separate School Board

The Metro Separate School Board is unique among municipal institutions in Metro because it is the only body that is elected on a Metro-wide basis. This board is the only separate school board within Metro, controlling both primary and secondary education in the separate school system, because there are no local separate school boards. Since it is the only separate school board, members are directly elected by the separate school supporters throughout Metro. Each municipality elects a certain number of representatives, on the basis of one to each Separate School Board ward. These wards are combinations of regular municipal wards in most cases; the entire municipality is considered one ward in the case of York and East York.<sup>1</sup> Altogether there are twenty-one Separate School wards - the distribution of these wards, and hence of separate school trustees - is provided in the last column of Table 6.

The voting provisions for separate school electors are more complicated than for public school electors. Separate school supporters make two separate choices: they vote once for the separate school representatives on area public school boards, and once for their local (i.e. ward) member of the Metro Separate School Board. It is possible that this situation has proved confusing for the voters, and it may account for the higher rates of acclamation and lower voting percentages in Metro Separate School Board elections.

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1. Separate School Ward boundaries are established by the Metropolitan Separate School Board, subject to the approval of the Ontario Municipal Board.

#### 4. Metropolitan Toronto School Board

Like Metro Council, the Metropolitan Toronto School Board is indirectly elected through the elections to the area boards of education. Again, like Metro Council, the membership of the Metro School Board is set out in the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act. The total number of members allowed to each municipality is prescribed by the Act: however, apart from the provision that each ward board chairman sit on the Metro Board, the area boards of education are free to choose their representatives from among the board members. There are twenty voting members of the Metro School Board:

- the chairman of each area board
- 5 additional members from the Toronto Board
- 1 additional member from the Etobicoke Board
- 3 additional members from the North York Board
- 2 additional members from the Scarborough Board
- 3 members from the Metropolitan Separate School Board

The Metro School Board elects a chairman from among its members. The only restriction on board membership is that representatives of area boards cannot be those members elected by separate school supporters. If it happens that one of the separate school members is chairman of the area board, then that board has to choose a member to replace the chairman on the Metro School Board.

If anything, the indirect elections to the Metro School Board are further removed from the voter than indirect elections to Metro Council. Both the area board chairmen, who are automatically members of the Metro Board, and the other board representatives on the Metro School Board, are chosen by the area boards of education from within their own ranks. The voter has a choice about who to elect to the area board, but that is the extent of electoral involvement in public education. However, the Metro School Board also has a less direct role in education. It does not run programmes directly, except some for retarded and disabled children. But it does exercise control over area board budgets, and does establish the overall education budget to be supported by Metro-wide property taxes. Furthermore, it has a general responsibility for ensuring uniform quality of education across Metro. In view of the growing debate about the cost and quality of education, there may well be increased interest among voters in having a more direct voice in the supervisory functions of the Metro School Board.



## E. HYDRO AND PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSIONS

### 1. Background

In three Metro boroughs, East York, North York, and Etobicoke, the hydro commission constitutes the third locally-elected body. The public utilities commission of Scarborough, though it has some different responsibilities, can be considered the same type of organisation; it, too, is locally elected. These four organisations have all been established under the Public Utilities Act, the provincial legislation providing for the management and operation of local utilities, particularly hydro. The legislation stipulates that where there is such a commission, it must have either three or five members, of whom one is the mayor. The others are directly elected by a general vote of municipal electors.

However, neither the City of Toronto nor the Borough of York has this sort of commission. The City does have a hydro commission, but it is an appointed body established separately under the City of Toronto Act of 1911. The Borough of York used to organise its delivery of hydro-electric power through the City of Toronto until, in 1941, the township elected to establish a separate organisation. According to the Power Corporation Act, a township could have a commission to run its hydro services, but it was not obliged to do so. York decided to provide hydro services through a committee of council, rather than a separately elected commission. Although there have been suggestions that York should switch to the commission system, particularly in the early 1960's, it has retained council control over hydro.

### 2. Hydro Commission Elections and Appointments

In the four municipalities where there is an elected hydro or public utilities commission (East York, Etobicoke, North York, and Scarborough), the commission is composed of the mayor and two commissioners elected at large. It is difficult to know how the voters approach such an election. Although rising interest in energy issues may arouse greater voter concern in hydro or public utilities commissions, the present rate of acclamation and

low voter turnout suggests that voters may not feel able to make a meaningful choice about utilities policy. Moreover, these commissions report both to the municipal council and to Ontario Hydro; it has been suggested that council supervision might be slight but that Ontario Hydro exercises considerable influence over the local utilities.<sup>1</sup> It is possible to ask whether these commissions control local policy to a degree that warrants direct local election of the commissioners.

In the City of Toronto, the hydro commission is an appointed body. Members include the mayor, one member appointed by city council, and one member appointed by Ontario Hydro. It might be useful to examine the differences between the Toronto Commission and the elected commissions in the boroughs to see if there are any significant variations in the service provided.

The Borough of York has the only departmental hydro system. A comparison between its service and the service provided by hydro commissions might shed some light on how well a publicly-run business functions under the two systems. It has often been argued that self-supporting enterprises like hydro ought to be 'kept out of politics' and run on a purely business-like basis. Perhaps the differences between York Hydro and the other systems, if such differences exist, would provide a test of the argument.

#### F. OTHER BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS

The governmental structures discussed so far have all been elected either directly or indirectly. There is a further type of municipal structure, the appointed boards and commissions. These bodies exist both at the local and metropolitan levels. Their members are appointed, usually by the area or Metro council, but occasionally by other organisations like the area or

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1. The Organisation of Local Government in Metropolitan Toronto, The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto, 1975. p. 46

metro school boards, the provincial or federal governments, etc. In some cases, like the Metro Board of Commissioners of Police, there is provincial legislation governing who should be appointed to the board. For many boards, however, the council or other appointing body is at liberty to appoint any private citizens they choose.

In some cases, appointed boards are used to get local citizen representation on an agency that affects local affairs. This is often true of community centre boards of management, whose membership is usually made up of the ward councillors and four or five local citizens. Even when boards are a vehicle for citizen participation, one might ask which citizens are getting an opportunity to participate, or whether local control could be exercised through a medium other than council appointment.

Although their members are appointed, local and Metro boards often have considerable control over public policy within the municipal framework. Such important bodies as the Toronto Transit Commission, the Courts of Revision, and the Committees of Adjustment are appointed by area or Metro councils. There are more than one hundred local and Metro boards, but their number and range of functions make it difficult for the average voter to sort out what powers they have, who appoints them, and what reporting relationship they have to an elected body. The lack of information and lack of awareness about such boards usually means that the councils' appointing powers, though they may be considerable, are rarely discussed. Nevertheless, the voter chooses the council and it in turn makes appointments to a great many public boards.

## G. CONCLUSION

There are 189 locally-elected positions within the municipalities of Metro Toronto; 94 on area councils, 8 on hydro or public utilities commissions and 87 on area boards of education. Table 7 provides the breakdown by municipality. In addition to locally-elected positions, there are 21 trustees of the Metro Separate School Board who are elected by separate school supporters throughout Metro.

Elections within the metropolitan community play a very important part in the government of the area.

TABLE 7: ELECTED POSITIONS IN AREA MUNICIPALITIES<sup>1)</sup>

<u>Municipality</u>	<u>Council</u>	<u>Hydro/PUC</u>	<u>Board of Education</u>	<u>Total</u>
City of Toronto	23	-	25	48
East York	9	2	10	21
Etobicoke	15	2	12	29
North York	19	2	16	37
Scarborough	17	2	14	33
York	11	-	10	21
Total	94	8	87	189

1) excludes the Metro Toronto Separate School Board, whose 21 members are elected by Separate School electors throughout Metro, on the basis of special wards made up of combinations of 2 or more municipal wards.



It is through these elections that the voters make their choices about which candidates are best able to represent their interests. Although they vote only to fill positions on local councils, hydro commissions, and area boards of education, these electoral decisions have wider consequences. The outcome of local elections not only determines the membership of local councils, but also establishes who will represent the municipality on Metro Council.<sup>1</sup> In a similar fashion, elections to the area boards of education and to Metro Separate School Board determine the membership of these bodies; the elected members in turn choose representatives to Metro School Board from within their own ranks.

Members of these structures are elected, directly or indirectly, to govern on behalf of the citizens. But there are some cases where governing power is delegated to a separate board or commission. Such boards are never entirely independent of elected organisations; even if a board has considerable operating autonomy, its members are nonetheless appointed by area councils, Metro council, the school boards, or some other appointing agency. The power of appointment provides a measure of control over boards and commissions. This means, therefore, that when the electorate chooses its council, it is not only choosing the membership of local and metro governments, but is also selecting the group responsible for scores of appointments to boards and commissions.

The nature of locally-elected positions can have a significant impact on how municipal government is conducted. Unlike the classic system of responsible government in which the legislative assembly chooses its own executive from among the general membership, local

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1. This is not to contradict the earlier point about the lack of a direct Metro choice for individual voters. Although the individual voter in some municipalities cannot identify all the candidates for Metro council, the collective electorate does choose the Metro representatives: in Toronto, by awarding more votes to one ward alderman than to the other; and, in the three boroughs mentioned, by electing a council that will complete the municipal representation on Metro through its choice of additional Metro councillors from among the elected ward aldermen.

government is based on separate and independent grants of power for different elected positions. The practice of separate elections for mayor and controllers gives them a basis of public support independent of the ward-elected aldermen who comprise a majority of the council. Although all members must work together if the council is to operate effectively, there is no guarantee of general agreement among members elected to different positions. Because of separate electoral mandates, the mayor and controllers do not depend on the broad support of the legislature, or council, for their positions. They are at liberty to pursue divergent courses, even though the effective functioning of municipal government may suffer if they do.<sup>1</sup>

However, a separately elected executive body in the form of a board of control is not nearly so well-established. It has been subject to far more criticism than the office of mayor, usually on the grounds that a body of this sort creates a much greater potential for disharmony within the council.

There are arguments against the separate election of councils, boards of education, and hydro commissions that proceed along similar lines. One of the main complaints is that the existence of separately-elected bodies act against co-ordination of local services. For example, the separation of municipal councils and boards of education complicates (but by no means rules out) the use of school facilities for general social and recreational purposes. Another line of argument is that separate bodies make it more difficult for the voter to identify who is responsible for various policies and regulations. Although these criticisms have been levelled at separately-elected bodies, it is far more common for the complaints to be directed at the extensive network of separate non-elected boards and commissions. Not only are these organisations remote from citizen control, but also there are so many of them that citizens are hard pressed even to keep track of what boards exist and what they do.

The significance of elections and of the structure of elected and non-elected bodies is far-reaching; both have a major impact on the operation of municipal government. If one goal of the electoral system ought to

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1. The at-large election of the mayor is a long standing tradition in Canadian local government and is now seemingly inviolable. This is in spite of the fact that the position of the mayor is not endowed by legislation with any substantial powers nor does there exist any generally understood rationale in the Canadian context for the election to this office on an at-large basis.

be the combination of the clearest and most direct system of electoral choice with the most effective organisation of elected offices, then it is apparent that Metro electoral systems - like those elsewhere - are some distance from the ideal.



## SECTION 2: REPRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATIVENESS

## A) Introduction

As the introduction to this study pointed out, the main function of the electoral system is to supply the structures and procedures through which the voters choose representatives to govern on their behalf. The idea that voters are represented is a complex one; it includes both the concept of voter representation and the notion of council<sup>1</sup> representativeness. In a sense, these are simply two aspects of the same phenomenon: one is concerned with the voter's relationship to his elected representative, and the other deals with the ability of elected members to represent their constituents. But for the purposes of this discussion, we shall distinguish between 'representation' and 'representativeness'.

Representation will be used to mean the equality of representation to which each voter is entitled. The issue of equity has been one of the traditional concerns of electoral systems, and two basic principles have long been accepted: that each person's vote, should be equal to every other person's vote, and that every person should have the same access to an elected representative. In practical terms, this usually means that constituencies or wards should contain the same population. By putting the emphasis on equality of ward populations, the electoral system tends to emphasize equal access more than equal vote. The reason is that, ultimately, those elected are required to represent all the people, not only those eligible to vote. They must make decisions on such matters as recreational facilities for children and special programmes designed to help new immigrants.

If the stress were put on equal weight for each vote, then wards would have to contain the same number of voters. But in some wards, where more of the population is made up of families with small children or immigrants who are not yet entitled to vote, there would be a comparatively low ratio of voters to total population. Thus the elected representative, although in principle responsible to the same number of voters as any other ward alderman, would have to represent more people than some of his counterparts. Because all residents have an interest in their community, whether they are eligible to vote or not, the electoral system must ensure that elected members bear an equal burden in representing the interest of ward residents.

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1. Although the multi-purpose municipal council is used as the example throughout this section, the arguments apply equally well - though perhaps with less urgency - to other elected bodies.



Representativeness, however, introduces considerations beyond the issue of voter equity. The question is not whether voters in different wards have the same relationship to their elected representatives, but whether the council as a whole can effectively represent the variety of opinions and concerns of the electorate. Adequate representation of different group interests is the key to representativeness. Although the principles of voter equity are uniformly accepted, there is still considerable debate about representativeness. For instance, one of the key questions is whether a council can represent the diversity of groups in a community even if its members are not drawn from all of those groups. To give a simplistic example, can a council composed entirely of homeowners give adequate representation to tenants, whose interests differ on questions like rent control, landlord-tenant relations, and property maintenance regulations?

In practice, the issue is much more complicated for several reasons. For one thing, municipal councils are not large enough to include a representative from each of the identifiable groups within the municipality. Moreover, if each group, regardless of its size, had a representative on council, then the principle of voter equity would be violated. Another reason for the difficulties surrounding the concept of representativeness is that a member's attitudes cannot always be predicted by his external characteristics. For instance, if after ten years of being a tenant, a councillor buys a house, is it reasonable to assume that the mere act of purchase has made this person unaware of or unsympathetic to the interests of tenants? Or, perhaps more important, is it reasonable to assume that councillors who are homeowners (or tenants) would not take the trouble to investigate the particular interests and concerns of the other group? Considerations like these make it difficult to arrive at a satisfactory operational definition of representativeness. Nevertheless, one can reasonably argue that a council should be drawn from a cross-section of the population in terms of such important characteristics as income and social class, ethnic origin, sex, and age. The more varied the composition of council, the more likely it is that it will have the experience and information to deal effectively with the wide range of issues it must consider.

## B) REPRESENTATION

### 1. Representation on Area Councils

The most common way of assessing the equality of representation within a municipality is to examine ward populations. Regardless of how many representatives are elected from each ward, if the populations are roughly similar then it is assumed that each voter has an equal opportunity to affect the outcome of the election, and equal access to the ward representatives. Table 8 provides population broken down by ward for each of the area municipalities. As this table shows, there is substantial variation in ward populations in most municipalities. The contrast between the smallest and largest wards in North York and in Scarborough illustrates the point.

NORTH YORK	Smallest (Ward 6)	25,160
	Largest (Ward 5)	54,231
SCARBOROUGH	Smallest (Ward 12)	13,213
	Largest (Ward 8)	38,935

It is clear that the principles of equal vote and equal access are not very well realised in some of the municipalities. We must examine what factors can account for these discrepancies.

The Ontario Municipal Board is responsible for establishing ward boundaries. In the case of newly-created municipalities, the initial division into wards is done by the OMB in time for the new municipality's first election. In the case of older municipalities, or of new ones that have been functioning for some time, the municipal council can apply to the Board for a redivision of wards.<sup>1</sup> Usually this is done when annexation of new territories, uneven population growth, or other considerations have meant that the existing wards are no longer an adequate basis for aldermanic elections.


In deciding where to draw ward boundaries, the OMB is guided by several principles. The first and over-

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1. Provincial legislation also provides that municipal voters can petition the OMB for ward redivision.

TABLE 8: WARD POPULATIONS

City of Toronto (11 wards: 2 aldermen per ward)			Borough of North York (14 wards: 1 alderman per ward)		
Ward No.	1 ...	57,597	Ward No.	1 ...	35,571
	2 ...	61,989		2 ...	37,339
	3 ...	61,802		3 ...	49,085
	4 ...	62,241		4 ...	32,085
	5 ...	63,878		5 ...	54,213
	6 ...	61,857		6 ...	25,160
	7 ...	63,940		7 ...	38,780
	8 ...	63,145		8 ...	32,624
	9 ...	62,272		9 ...	37,704
	10 ...	62,099		10 ...	39,895
	11 ...	61,432		11 ...	28,829
<hr/>				12 ...	42,925
TOTAL		682,252		13 ...	39,828
				14 ...	48,817
			<hr/>		
Borough of East York (4 wards: 2 aldermen per ward)			TOTAL		543,662
Ward No.	1 ...	34,888	Borough of Scarborough (12 wards: 1 alderman per ward)		
	2 ...	24,216	Ward No.	1 ...	26,981
	3 ...	32,185		2 ...	30,016
	4 ...	14,821		3 ...	28,693
<hr/>				4 ...	39,997
TOTAL		106,110		5 ...	28,878
				6 ...	34,735
Borough of Etobicoke (5 wards: 2 aldermen per ward)				7 ...	33,991
Ward No.	1 ...	51,213		8 ...	38,935
	2 ...	59,308		9 ...	34,724
	3 ...	77,815		10 ...	31,274
	4 ...	59,630		11 ...	22,115
	5 ...	40,152		12 ...	13,213
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TOTAL		288,118	TOTAL		363,552
			Borough of York (8 wards: 1 alderman per ward)		
			Ward No.	1 ...	15,939
				2 ...	19,773
				3 ...	17,991
				4 ...	15,174
				5 ...	15,752
				6 ...	18,477
				7 ...	20,773
				8 ...	16,522
<hr/>			<hr/>		
			TOTAL		140,401



1975  
THE MUNICIPALITY OF  
METROPOLITAN TORONTO  
AREA MUNICIPALITIES AND WARDS  
Figure 2



riding one is that all wards should have approximately equal population. However, the OMB must also take into account the fact that ward boundaries will remain in effect for a number of years. This means that, especially in fast-growing municipalities, there has to be some anticipation of where future growth is likely to occur. If all the wards were chosen for equal population size, rapid growth in one part of the municipality could create serious population imbalances within a relatively short period of time. Therefore, the deliberate creation of wards with comparatively low population can sometimes be attributed to the anticipation of future growth. Often this serves a useful political function as well, because the opening up of new subdivisions in growth areas can create a great deal of work for the ward representatives, even before the population reaches its expected size. Thus, the problem of location and rate of growth must be taken into account when assessing the ward sizes given in Table 8. It is important to remember, however, that the process of anticipating future growth is often highly uncertain; unexpected patterns of growth and development can sometimes throw off the predicted equality of ward populations.

A further consideration is the concern to keep communities of interest within a single ward, so that their political power is not fragmented. It is well established that breaking up communities so that parts are in different wards or constituencies can deprive them of fair representation. Although each of the community's voters will still be entitled to cast a ballot, the collective strength of their votes can be overwhelmed by the opposing votes of other ward residents. This will occur, for instance, if the boundaries are drawn so that the community, instead of constituting 60% of one ward's population, is 15% of the population in each of four separate wards. The concern about maintaining communities of interest applies in many spheres. For instance, working class neighbourhoods in the core area have special concerns about housing and urban redevelopment that can be effectively expressed only when the neighbourhoods are able to exercise their collective political power. Similarly, the particular interests and needs of ethnic communities mean that the communities must have a fair opportunity to choose a member who can express their opinions. For example, if the communities contain a sizeable group of immigrants whose native language is not English, it is especially important that the voting members of the community are not prevented (by the way ward boundaries are drawn) from choosing a representative who is fluent in their language and familiar with their concerns as new residents of the municipality.

The question of communities of interest also arises when small municipalities are amalgamated or become part of a larger existing municipality. In his 1965 report on Metro, Carl Goldenberg recommended that the OMB 'should endeavour, as far as possible, to retain the whole of an amalgamating municipality within a single ward', and suggested that 'the Lakeshore municipalities (Long Branch, Mimico, New<sup>1</sup> Toronto) could form one of the wards ... in Etobicoke'. This explains why Etobicoke's Ward 5, which is the Lakeshore area, is significantly smaller in population than the borough's other wards. By making the three municipalities a single ward, the OMB ensured that these voters would have an opportunity to elect someone who could represent their particular point of view on the borough council. Such representation is especially important in the years immediately following amalgamation, when the transition to the new governmental organisation is being made. When the old municipal structures have been thoroughly absorbed into the new municipality, other communities of interest may emerge and the ward boundaries can be redrawn accordingly.

These factors represent the non-quantifiable considerations relevant to the discussion of equitable representation. Although numerical standards are relatively easy to establish and to maintain, they may not be sensitive to some of the obstacles to equity, particularly in areas where population size has not yet stabilised. To some extent, then, numerical inequalities in 'population represented' may obscure the special needs or longer-term considerations affecting equality of representation.

## 2. Representation on Metro Council

Representation on the council of the Metropolitan Municipality is governed by the same principles as representation on area councils. The main concern is to have representation proportional to population, but considerations of population growth and communities of interest are also relevant. Table 9 illustrates the variation in local representation on Metro Council for the years 1967, 1971, and 1975. From 1967 to the end of 1974, the number of area representatives on Metro council remained constant at 32. But as the 1967 and 1971 figures demonstrate, the distribution of representatives among municipalities became less equitable as the distribution of population changed. Particularly in the borough of North York, rapid growth meant a relative underrepresentation of borough residents on Metro Council.

1. H. Carl Goldenberg, The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto Report, 1965. p. 196

TABLE 9: VARIATIONS IN LOCAL REPRESENTATION ON METRO COUNCIL, 1967, 1971, 1975

	No. of Mem- bers	1967 1)				1971 1)				No. of Mem- bers	1975 3)		
		Total Population	Population Per Member	Variation from Metro Average	Total Population	Population Per Member	Variation from Metro Average	Total Population	Population Per Member		Total Population	Population Per Member	Variation from Metro Average
Metro Toronto (excluding Chairman)	32	1,878,037	58,689	-----	2,072,696	64,834	-----	2,124,095	57,408	37	2,124,095	57,408	-----
City of Toronto	12	685,313	57,109	- 1,580	690,484	57,540	- 7,294	682,252	56,854	12	682,252	56,854	- 554
East York	2	97,555	48,777	- 9,912	104,496	52,248	-12,586	106,110	53,055	2	106,110	53,055	-4,353
Etobicoke	4	266,458	66,614	+ 7,925	281,476	70,369	+ 5,535	288,118	57,624	5	288,118	57,624	+ 216
North York	6	411,517	68,586	+ 9,897	519,456	86,576	+12,742	543,662	60,407	9	543,662	60,407	+2,999
Scarborough	5	275,632	55,126	- 3,563	333,750	66,750	+ 1,926	363,552	60,592	6	363,552	60,592	+3,184
York	3	141,562	47,187	-11,502	143,034	47,678	-17,156	140,401	46,800	3	140,401	46,800	-10,608

1) Assessed Population as of December 31

2) Reflects change in Metro Council representation effective Jan. 1, 1975

3) Assessed population as of Oct. 6, 1974 (the latest available figures) is being used as 1975 population for this comparison.

NOTE: Negative variation shows degree of over-representation.  
Positive variation shows degree of under-representation.



However, the addition of five new members to Metro Council in 1975 was instrumental in providing more balanced representation of population. Three of the new members are from North York, one from Scarborough and one from Etobicoke. The addition of these members changed the Metro average population per member and, by increasing the suburban representation, brought each municipality's representation closer to the Metro average. Both York and East York remain significantly over-represented on Metro council, but this can be attributed, at least in part, to the 'communities of interest' argument discussed earlier.

Equitable representation on Metro Council, though it follows the same principles that guide representation on area councils, presents some special problems. One difficulty arises partly because of the nature of election to Metro Council. If there were direct election to council on the basis of special metro wards, then boundaries could be drawn without reference to existing municipal divisions. But because Metro is a federation and because election is indirect, the area municipality remains the basic unit for distributing seats on Metro Council. Representation must be assigned within the restrictions of area municipalities' boundaries and populations. However, the varying sizes of the municipalities do not lend themselves to a single and precise distribution of representatives. This problem could be solved if Metro Council were made large enough to allow for exact representation of municipal population. If there were no limit on the number of members on Metro Council, then municipal populations could be divided up into groups as small as necessary to ensure that each would be equally represented. If the groups contained, for instance, 25,000 people, then East York would get four Metro representatives and North York would get twenty-two. But this solution would create its own dilemma - how to run a council of 75 or 100 members that would be required to achieve equal representation for equal population groups.<sup>1</sup>

Another consideration in deciding on area representation on Metro Council involves minimum representation. Each municipality must have at least one member on Metro Council if it is to be represented at all. The practice of having two or more areas share a representative has been tried in some regional governments and abandoned because of local dissatisfaction. Although such a system has never been proposed for Metro government, there is a convention that no municipality's representation will be reduced. This means that when redistribution of seats is being considered, it is done by increasing the total number of representatives on Metro Council, to avoid increasing one municipality's number of members at the expense of another's. The small municipality's relative strength is reduced, as population factors dictate, but its absolute

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1. This however may not be an impossible task. Many British councils, for example, serving communities with populations smaller than Metro Toronto have council memberships that exceed 100.



representation in terms of number on council, does not change. This places a further restriction on the distribution of seats on Metro Council. In addition to the need for representation by population, there is a concern to allocate Metro seats within the conflicting restrictions of keeping council size manageable and maintaining the minimum size of area delegations.

### 3. Combined Local/Metro Aspects of Representation

The discussion so far has been confined to equality of representation within a municipality, either the area municipality or the metropolitan municipality. Usually it is argued that intra-municipal equality is the main issue in representation. As long as each alderman within a municipality represents the same number of people, it does not matter - for the purposes of equity - whether that number is 10,000 or 50,000. The size of the ward population simply reflects the total population of the municipality and the size of council; each municipality can make its own decisions.

The special nature of Metro government, however, raises questions about inter-municipal equality of representation. All Metro councillors share both local and Metro responsibilities. Even if they represent roughly equal population groups for Metro purposes, there are wide disparities in the size of population they represent on the local council. Table 10 gives the breakdown of average population per member for the area municipalities. The problem raised by these figures is whether citizens in separate municipalities do get equal representation on Metro council, if the total responsibilities of their Metro councillors differ so substantially. For example, the East York alderman on Metro Council represents roughly 53,055 people for metro purposes and 13,264 people for local purposes. But a Toronto alderman on Metro Council, who represents 56,854 people for Metro purposes, (approximately the same as the East York alderman) represents 31,011 people for local affairs.

Given the size of this discrepancy, is it reasonable to assume that a Toronto citizen has the same access to his Metro representative that the East York citizen has to his? It is possible to argue that access is the same on the grounds that the Toronto alderman spends more time and is paid more, in total, than the East York alderman. One job is simply bigger than the other. But there are limits to how much time one can devote to a job.

TABLE 10: POPULATION AND ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES

MUNICIPALITY	AVERAGE POPULATION PER WARD REPRESENTATIVE <sup>1)</sup>	AVERAGE POPULATION PER ELECTED OFFICIAL <sup>2)</sup>
City of Toronto	31,011	29,663
East York	13,264	11,790
Etobicoke	28,812	19,207
North York	38,833	28,614
Scarborough	30,296	21,385
York	17,550	12,764

1) Aldermen only

2) Includes mayor, controllers, and aldermen

If the East York alderman is working full-time, the Toronto alderman cannot compensate for his more extensive responsibilities by working more than full time. At some stage, the threshold is reached and equal representation must suffer. It could also be argued that different representatives deliberately maintain equal Metro representation by devoting different amounts of time to their local responsibilities. No doubt there are some differences of this sort, but the job of the elected member cannot be sliced up so easily. One of the central concerns of equal representation is equal citizen access to the elected representative, and the citizen defines his access to a representative, not by a neat categorisation of local and Metro affairs, but by his needs. Although this discussion has used the example of an alderman, the argument applies equally well to the case of a mayor or controller. To the extent that local responsibilities differ, they will affect Metro responsibilities. The elected representatives, far from controlling this state of affairs, must in the end simply accept the burdens involved.

### C. REPRESENTATIVENESS

The issue of representativeness as outlined at the beginning of this section deals with the question of whether a council must be representative of the main characteristics of the electorate in order to represent its interests effectively. The problem is not simple. It is impossible for a council to be a perfect reflection of the community it represents, if only because of the enormous variety of people in a community. But apart from that, the concept of representativeness is subject to certain logical limits. Representativeness is only relevant to the extent that the characteristics or interests involved can affect attitudes about municipal issues. It does not matter whether the council is representative of the range of hair colours or tastes in furniture of the community, for these factors have no effect on the decisions that elected representatives must make. Furthermore, representativeness is to some degree controlled by the voters. It is they who will make the final choices, and if their preference favours one group over another, it is a reflection of their legitimate power to make such a choice and not a matter that one can dispute.

But representativeness does raise the critical issue of the range of choice available to voters. If the group of candidates is restricted to people who favour the same interests and share the same attributes, then the voter has little to say about how representative the council shall be. One may argue that it is in fact up to the voters to nominate candidates who, as a group, display the range of characteristics that the voters want in their council. But this raises the question of what built-in or institutional restrictions on candidate eligibility exist in the electoral system. The practical limits on eligibility, as distinct from the legal restrictions, are the central concern in the 'representativeness' potential of the electoral system. Not all of the practical limits are necessarily undesirable. For instance, the simple fact that an elected representative must work very hard at his job rules out the lazy and the unindustrious. But the practical considerations, whether desirable or not, must be examined if the full impact of the electoral system is to be assessed.

## 1. Candidate Eligibility

The legal requirements governing eligibility are simple. A person must be an eligible voter (a resident, Canadian citizen or other British subject, and at least 18 years old) and must not be disqualified from holding municipal office by virtue of his job or legal status. However, these legal requirements do not reflect the practical, social, or personal factors that affect candidate eligibility. These factors must be considered because they present certain limits on who can, in fact rather than law, stand for election and govern on our behalf.

One common way to identify the informal qualifications of candidacy is to examine those who have been elected to office and see what characteristics they share, and how well they reflect the range in the community. There are two obvious problems with this approach. One is that it looks only at successful candidates, and cannot therefore give adequate consideration to the possibility that the voters themselves have made choices about representativeness. The second problem is that genuine representativeness involves all sorts of factors that can only be effectively examined through a detailed study of the community and the candidates. Although some general



suggestions can be put forward on the basis of aggregate data and common sense, they are more useful for raising possibilities than for arriving at specific conclusions. This discussion is, therefore, severely limited and is meant to introduce the problem rather than to assess how representative area councils really are.

One clue to the question of representativeness lies in the private occupations of council members. The breakdown for area municipalities is given in Table 11. The occupational categories used are unfortunately loose; there are invariably many problems with occupational classifications because occupation is often used as a surrogate for income and social status as well as to present some information about personal skills and experience. It is difficult to know what we are measuring with occupation, and Table 11 incorporates many of the problems with using an occupational variable. However, the table can be used to some extent in considering the job security aspects of the decision to seek municipal office. It indicates that members of professional and business occupations are, compared to their frequency in the total population over-represented on municipal councils and that other groups such as skilled labour, are under-represented.

Becoming involved in politics as a candidate carries with it certain risks, particularly in local government where the term of office is only two years. One of the major risks is that it may be difficult to get a job after the period in office is over. Thus, those who have a job they can maintain on a part-time basis, or can re-enter with relative ease, have a significant advantage over those who cannot retain some connection with their private occupation. Lawyers, for example, will find it easier to work part-time and to resume their occupation than factory workers will. The same is often true of people who run their own business, either as merchants or in freelance occupations. People with job flexibility have advantages both in terms of supplementary income and, perhaps more important, in terms of minimising the risks of spending time in public office. The problem of future job security may well be a significant factor in the decision of many worthwhile candidates not to seek public office. It can be argued that 'self-selection' factors like job security introduce an occupational bias to elected councils.

Job background is relevant to informal candidate eligibility because it is an important element in providing people with skills that make them better prepared to deal with some aspects of council work (e.g., training in law or accounting). It has often been observed that many successful candidates for public office are in 'brokerage'

TABLE 11: PRIVATE OCCUPATIONS OF AREA COUNCIL MEMBERS

MUNICIPALITY	OCCUPATIONS						TOTAL
	Lawyers	Teachers	Insurance <sup>1)</sup>	Other Profes/ <sup>2)</sup> Managerial	Business/ Sales	Retired/Non- Labour Force	Other <sup>3)</sup>
Toronto	4	4	-	8	5	-	2
East York	1	1	1	5	-	1	-
Etcobicoke	-	1	1	4	3	4	2
North York	2	1	1	7	6	2	-
Scarborough	1	2	-	7	6	1	-
York	1	-	2	4	4	-	1
TOTAL	9	9	5	34	24	8	5
							94

1) Includes underwriters, executives, consultants

2) Includes a wide range of occupations (e.g., pharmacist, accountant, etc.)

3) Also includes full-time politicians.

occupations where their skills in problem-solving and dealing with people have been developed. No doubt this makes them both attractive candidates and effective councillors. However, the question of skills and training should not be overemphasised. Valuable public service, especially at the municipal level, does not depend entirely on the occupational or organizational expertise that one can bring to the office. It is also based on one's understanding of local issues and ability to present the community's views and concerns. Every new municipal representative has much to learn about the government of a city or borough, and previously acquired training, though helpful, is no guarantee of effective performance. If public office is to remain open to a wide range of candidates and not only to those who are professionally well-suited, then it must remain open at the municipal level where the opportunities for governing experience are numerous.

A third factor affecting the possibilities of genuine representativeness is the cost of running for public office. The cost of municipal campaigns varies greatly with the size of the electorate. Although some ward campaigns can be relatively inexpensive, the campaign for at-large elections of mayors and controllers can easily rival federal or provincial election campaigns in the amount of money required. But, unlike federal and provincial elections, there are no formal party organizations at the municipal level to help the candidate bear the cost of running for office. Although no data have been gathered on election expenses in Metro Toronto, such information would certainly improve our knowledge of the recruitment of candidates. The costs involved in seeking public office and access to private sources of campaign financing are important considerations in informal candidate eligibility. Both factors can have a significant impact on who is, in realistic terms, eligible for municipal office.

Private job security, job background and election costs are three of the factors that can affect the council's potential for representativeness. To the extent that these concerns deter people from running for office, they act as restrictions on the municipal electoral system. Although the formal eligibility requirements do not distinguish between rich and poor or professional and labourer, the informal limits can be much more restrictive. There is no proof that a council must



be representative to deal fairly with the interests of the entire community, but is clear that a broadly representative council has special advantages for appreciating and dealing effectively with the variety of interests within a municipality.

## 2. The Demands and Rewards of Elective Office

The issue of representativeness is not confined to the entry costs of public life. The job itself has a profound impact on the question of who is willing to run for election. The main factors affecting willingness, apart from the essential consideration of interest in local government affairs, are workload and pay. Serving on a municipal council is often a demanding and arduous job, but not one that is particularly well paid. In order to contemplate running for office, one must be prepared to accept that the job is not based on a regular, well-defined eight hour day and that the remuneration involved is not necessarily suitable compensation for the present and future costs of the job.

Questions of workload and pay do not affect representativeness in quite the same way that private occupational security and election costs do. In a sense, these actual demands and rewards of the job are secondary restrictions on representativeness. For instance, there are some people whose employment opportunities and financial resources simply do not allow them to consider running for office, regardless of the work or pay involved. But, for the others who can realistically think about becoming candidates, these job questions have a significant influence on their decision.<sup>1</sup> Such potential candidates will take into account how much private work can

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1. There are also psychological factors that can have an enormous influence on the decision to become a candidate - how intensely one wishes to become involved in municipal decision-making, how much one enjoys politics, how much one would find a public career personally rewarding, and so on. Such psychological considerations, although they are for some people more important than pragmatic concerns of workload and pay, cannot be attributed to the structure of elections and elective office, and are therefore not of the same concern in the issue of representativeness.



be combined with municipal office, what kind of burden the job will put on their personal and family lives, how well the pay compares with normal private earnings, and to what extent the pay can compensate for private opportunities they must forego.

The question of how much work is involved in elective office is a difficult one to answer, primarily because a certain amount of work is assumed or declined voluntarily, and because the demands on an official's time can vary substantially from one ward to another and from one municipality to another. In a report prepared for the Borough of North York, a group of management consultants examined the workload of aldermen and controllers.<sup>1</sup> Their general findings were that in North York, an alderman spends between 25.0 and 33.5 (average 28.5) hours per week on borough-related functions, while controllers spend between 28.0 and 37.25 hours per week on borough work. Controllers also devoted an average of 12 hours a week to their Metro responsibilities, thus having an average total worktime of 43.75 hours in borough and Metro affairs.

A similar study of Metro councillors emphasised the lack of uniformity in workload. However, the report did note that 'most Metro councillors indicated that they are occupied full-time in serving their respective area municipalities, together with their overall Metro duties'. In describing the range of workloads among Metro councillors, the study states that 'some members spend in excess of fifty hours per week in the discharge of their duties', while on the other hand, 'certain Metro council members find sufficient time over and above their political duties to pay attention to outside income-producing activities to varying degrees of their total work week'.<sup>2</sup>

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1. The Thorne Group, A Report prepared for the Borough of North York on Remuneration for Members of Council and Selected Boards, Committees and Commissions, 1974. pp. 21, 22.
  2. Price, Waterhouse Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Salary Evaluation Study, March, 1974. pp.8, 13.

It is virtually impossible to establish uniform estimates of volume of work. But, in any case, such estimates can be misleading insofar as the issues of representativeness are concerned. The problem is not one of variation in the exact amounts of elective work in Metro; rather, it is related to the position that elective responsibilities take in the member's life. Workload, in the context of representativeness, is a factor that determines the extent to which they can retain some connection with their private occupation and thereby determines, in part, the risks involved in taking part in municipal government.

The other main aspect of elected positions that influences possible candidates is remuneration. Tables 12 and 12A list the salary and expenses given to members of area and Metro councils. There are a number of ways to assess such information. One common approach is to examine remuneration for roughly comparable jobs in other municipalities, other levels of government, and in the private sector. The purpose of comparisons is to establish both a fair rate of remuneration, so that the office holders are adequately compensated for their work, and a competitive level of pay, so that competent candidates are not deterred from seeking public office by inadequate remuneration. However, these considerations must also be viewed within a broader framework of the impact of holding office on the candidate's private occupation.

Because of the uncertainties of a political career, potential candidates must evaluate remuneration not only in terms of how fairly it rewards the work they will have to do in office, but also in terms of how well it compensates them for the opportunities they must forego and the possible hardships they face when they are no longer serving in an elected position. Because certain occupations involve greater 're-entry' risk than others, people in these jobs must place greater reliance on the remuneration available to elected representatives when they are making the decision about candidacy. If the pay is not sufficient to offset the risks, then some potential candidates must regard themselves as ineligible, and the possibilities for a broadly representative council will thus be reduced.

TABLE 12: BASIC SALARY AND EXPENSES OF ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES<sup>1)</sup>

MUNICIPALITY	MAYOR	CONTROLLER	COUNCILLOR	ADDITIONAL IF ON PLANNING BOARD
City of Toronto <sup>2)</sup>	\$34,000	\$26,500	\$18,000	-
East York	15,000	-	7,500	480
Etobicoke <sup>3)</sup>	23,300	17,140	8,910	2,000
North York	31,000	20,900	12,600	3,000
Scarborough	28,500	20,100	13,000	-
York	23,000	15,000	8,600	1,000

1) Excludes any payment for serving on Metro Council

2) Chairmen of committees receive an additional \$400

3) Chairmen of standing committees receive an additional \$500

TABLE 12A: ADDITIONAL SALARY AND EXPENSES FOR METRO COUNCIL MEMBERS\*

Metro Council Member	\$6,000
Member of Metro Executive	4,000
Chairman of Metro Committee	500

\*Metro By-law 106-74 limits total remuneration allowed to Metro Council members (excluding chairman) to \$40,000. Therefore, the mayors of Toronto and North York do not get the full pay for being on Metro Council and Metro Executive.

Questions of representativeness are concerned not so much with how well a council actually reflects the main characteristics of the electorate, but with the potential of the electoral system to ensure that candidates from all groups are, realistically as well as legally, eligible to run for office. When there are informal barriers, like those imposed by election costs or job security, then the voters will not have a full opportunity to choose who shall govern on their behalf.

### SECTION 3: THE VOTERS' CHOICE

#### A. Introduction

The centre of the electoral system is the process of voting. All the provisions governing who is eligible to vote, what positions are to be filled by election, who is eligible to run for office, and how the election is to be conducted, come together when the ballots are cast. Voting is not only the centre of the electoral system, but also the primary and most widely used form of citizen participation. Although many other forms of participation are available, especially since the recent increase in citizen concern about the major issues of local government, voting remains the only process where everyone's participatory act carries equal weight. The citizens' opportunities to affect municipal decisions may be more extensive in participatory structures like joint council-citizen committees, but it is only through voting that the general direction of municipal affairs can be established by the full collective citizenry.

#### B. Exercising The Municipal Franchise

##### 1. Voting Decisions

For the municipal elections held in December 1974, there were approximately 1,354,800 voters eligible to cast ballots in the municipalities of Metro Toronto. However, the choices facing voters differed from one municipality to the next, not only because the candidates were different, but also because the voters had varying



numbers of decisions to make. Table 13 summarises the number of choices confronting electors in the area municipalities. These ranged from a minimum of five in the City of Toronto and the borough of York, to a maximum of eleven in Etobicoke. As the table shows, separate school supporters in Scarborough, North York, and York had one more vote to cast than public school supporters did. While the public school vote involved electing one ward trustee to the area board of education, the separate school supporters had to choose one representative for the area board, and one for the Metro Separate School Board. This discrepancy did not exist in the other three municipalities where wards have two representatives each, both for council elections and for area board of education elections.

The case of the borough of Etobicoke is a useful one for illustrating the range of decisions facing a voter. In this municipality all voters were entitled to make the following choices:

Mayor	One vote for one candidate	1
Controllers	One vote for each of four candidates	4
Aldermen	One vote for each of two candidates	2
Hydro Commissioners	One vote for each of two candidates	2
		—
	Total	9

In addition, public school supporters voted for each of two candidates for the Etobicoke Board of Education, and separate school supporters voted for one candidate for the Etobicoke Board, and one candidate for the Metro Separate School Board. This brings the total possible choices for each voter to eleven.

Just as no eligible voter is obliged to vote, no elector is obliged to make a decision in all eleven possible cases. However, if the voter does have a preference in some or all of these possibilities, he has made decisions on a wide variety of issues. Unlike federal or provincial elections, where the voter

TABLE 13: VOTING CHOICES IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS\*

MUNICIPALITY	TOTAL NO. CHOICES TO MAKE	BREAKDOWN OF VOTING CHOICES				
		Mayor	Controllors	Aldermen	Hydro	School Board
City of Toronto	5 (5)	1	-	2	-	2 (2)
East York	7 (7)	1	-	2	2	2 (2)
Etobicoke	11 (11)	1	4	2	2	2 (2)
North York	9 (10)	1	4	1	2	1 (2)
Scarborough	9 (10)	1	4	1	2	1 (2)
York	5 (6)	1	2	1	-	1 (2)

\*Based on public school support. Voting decisions for separate school supporters shown in brackets.

summarises or balances all his preferences in one vote, municipal elections require the voter to make a series of separate decisions. In Etobicoke, the eleven allowable choices involve deciding on who can best head the municipality (the mayor), which candidates are best qualified to act as the borough's executive, which candidates will most effectively represent the voter's ward, which candidates will make the best Hydro Commissioners, and which candidates will best reflect the voter's views on educational policy and administration.

In order to make a thoughtful decision in all eleven cases, the Etobicoke voter was required to inform himself about the major issues involved in each election and about each candidate's position on these issues and general qualifications for holding the office. Preparation for voting could thus require a great deal of the voter's time. It might be argued that the voter who is truly interested in his local government will take the time to become fully informed, but even the interested voter is faced with some difficult problems. Because there are no formal political parties at the municipal level, there is no general guide to each candidate's attitudes on certain key issues. Although political party platforms are not always coherent wholes and party candidates sometimes disagree with elements of the platform, the existence of the party does simplify the voter's task of acquiring information about voting alternatives. In municipal government, this sort of organising principle would certainly serve to let the voters know which candidates are in general agreement with one another in the separate elections for mayor, controllers, and aldermen. But because there is no overall organising mechanism in municipal politics and because each voter has so many choices to make, thoughtful voting demands a great deal more initiative on the part of the voter in municipal elections.

One of the inevitable consequences of this complicated situation is that the voter, although he has more opportunities to express his preference in municipal elections, is less likely to be able to make fully informed decisions.<sup>1</sup> There are three common responses to the situ-

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1. Detailed studies of why voters make their choices have been restricted to elections where political party affiliation is an operative factor. The findings of such studies, though they are not uniform, indicate that very few people make what is described as a rational voting decision. Common explanations for voting choice are 'My family has always voted for that party' or 'The other candidate did not look honest (or hardworking, pleasant, nice, intelligent, etc.)'.

ation: 1) the voter does not bother to cast a ballot  
 2) the voter does cast a ballot, but makes his choices at random or because he recognises a candidate's name  
 3) the voter casts a ballot, but makes only a few of the many choices open to him; he does not bother to vote on the rest. Given the magnitude of the task facing the voter who wishes to become fully informed, it would not be surprising if less than half of those who do vote make deliberate decisions in all cases. The number may well be much smaller than 50%. This possibility, though hardly cause for jubilation, is understandable. Municipal elections are unwieldy from the voter's point of view. The campaigns require a greater effort on the part of the elector, because of the number of candidates involved, the range of issues requiring decisions, and the frequency of elections at the municipal level.

## 2. Voting Turnout

Aggregate data on the number of eligible electors who choose to vote cannot supply information about how many voters exercised all their possible votes or about which of their choices were deliberate and well thought out. But turnout figures can provide basic information about how many voters were interested enough to vote. Table 14 gives the percentage turnout for area municipalities in the past four elections; the subsequent tables include raw data on the number of eligible voters and the actual number voting. The summary in Table 14 indicates that there is a slight downward trend in voting turnout over the last eight years, though four elections may not be an adequate basis for establishing trends. Even this suggestion is subject to some qualification because of the exceptions; e.g., the turnout in 1972 in Toronto, and in 1969 in North York. What is striking about the figures in Table 14 is that voting turnout in all area municipalities for all four elections is so low. The percentage voting in federal and provincial elections is almost always at least 60%, but the municipal turnout rarely goes above 40% and is often less than 30%.

Various suggestions have been put forward to account for the low voting rate in municipal elections. These are only suggestions; no research has been done on voting and non-voting decisions at the municipal level, so there is no empirical verification of these observations. Furthermore, although all are reasonable hypotheses,



TABLE 14: VOTER TURNOUT IN LOCAL ELECTIONS

MUNICIPALITY	1966	1969	1972	1974
City of Toronto	38.0%	38.5%	42.6%	30.9%
East York <sup>1)</sup>	43.28	36.8	33.9	27.8
Etobicoke	32.40	30.58	29.77	28.25
North York	28.9	31.8	30.23	27.10
Scarborough	33.39	32.76	30.0	25.05
York <sup>1)</sup>	30.74	31.41	26.0 <sup>2)</sup>	30.75

1) Based on percentage of eligible voters  
voting for mayor

2) Estimates; position of mayor was not  
contested in 1972

TABLE 14A: CITY OF TORONTO VOTER TURNOUT

	1966	1969	1972	1974
Total Eligible	423,757	426,439	444,116	439,324
Total Voting	164,490	164,188	189,326	135,889
% Voting	38.0	38.5	42.6	30.9

TABLE 14B: EAST YORK VOTER TURNOUT

	1966	1969	1972	1974
Total Eligible	68,132	70,749	78,742	77,373
Total Voting <sup>1)</sup>	29,488	26,053	26,664	21,536
% Voting	43.28	36.8	33.9	27.8

1) Based on numbers voting for mayor

TABLE 14C: ETOBICOKE VOTER TURNOUT

	1966 <sup>1)</sup>	1969	1972	1974
Total Eligible	-	164,197	188,718	194,206
Total Voting	-	50,196	56,174	54,856
% Voting	-	30.58	29.77	28.25

1) Data not available for inclusion

TABLE 14D: NORTH YORK VOTER TURNOUT

	1966	1969	1972	1974
Total Eligible	221,268	259,673	309,000	331,000
Total Voting	64,168	82,434	93,418	89,763
% Voting	28.9	31.8	30.23	27.10

TABLE 14E: SCARBOROUGH VOTER TURNOUT

	1966	1969	1972	1974
Total Eligible	137,048	147,359	212,500	229,500
Total Voting	45,760	48,727	63,750	57,490
% Voting	33.39	32.76	30.0	25.05

TABLE 14F: YORK VOTER TURNOUT

	1966	1969	1972	1974
Total Eligible	84,064	81,547	87,409	83,435
Total Voting <sup>1)</sup>	25,844	25,613		25,635
% Voting	30.74	31.41	26.0 <sup>2)</sup>	30.75

1) Based on numbers who voted for mayor

2) Approximate; position of mayor was not contested in 1972.



it is not possible to decide which set of arguments has greater explanatory power. One of the most common explanations of low municipal turnout is simply that voters have little interest in municipal government. Two separate arguments are used to support this contention. One is that municipal government responsibilities, when compared to federal and provincial responsibilities, involve matters that are of relatively little concern to the voters. Because local government deals with mundane questions, its elections are not worth bothering about. The second argument is that local government problems are not political and therefore do not arouse the interests of the voters. This line of argument emphasises the physical service aspects of municipal responsibilities and gives rise to comments like 'There is only one way to plow streets or collect garbage'.

Both these arguments are persuasive in certain ways, but it is important to distinguish between municipalities facing problems that do not divide the population and those facing problems that are the subject of major disagreements. Often the distinguishing characteristic is the municipality's stage of growth. In built-up municipalities, new growth involves the replacement of old buildings; decisions about the type, density and price of new developments, especially residential developments, become a major concern among the citizens. Even those not directly affected may have an interest in what precedents are established.

At the same time there may be sharp cleavages in public opinion regarding transportation, about whether resources should be allocated to the provision of expressways to facilitate the movement of vehicles or the improvement and extension of rapid or mass transit facilities to move people. The division of opinion regarding such issues as development and transportation, for example, represents a growing public awareness of their consequences for the urban environment. In these circumstances issues such as development, transportation, etc., can become the focus for municipal politics.

Another explanation of low voter turnout is based on the relatively confusing nature of local elections. As outlined in the preceding section, municipal voters have to make decisions on issues and candidates, and they do so without the benefit of any organising principle like party politics. It is possible that many voters do not or cannot take the time to become adequately informed and that, rather than make random choices, they simply do not vote.

The two approaches to explaining low turnout (i.e., lack of interest and voter confusion) may both be relevant to the voting patterns in suburban municipalities. Tables 14D and 14E give the raw figures and the percentage turnout for North York and Scarborough. The percentages tend to understate the growing gap between the number of eligible voters and the number who actually vote. Although there have been substantial increases in the number of eligible voters, there has been little change in the number voting. To some extent this pattern must be attributed to the fact that the large numbers of new residents are not familiar with borough politics. It may take them several years to develop a concern about government policy at the borough level and to sort out the special local issues and the range of local candidates. However, more detailed explanations of the voting pattern in these boroughs, and of the low turnout generally, must be based on the results of special municipal election studies.

One of the questions raised by turnout figures is what effect the low support has on municipal government. The councils are legally elected and empowered to represent all the citizens, even if only a small percentage came out to vote. However, the job of the elected representatives is not made any easier by the poor turnout. Municipal governments, like other elected bodies, depend on electoral support for their political legitimacy. Although much of the regular council work does not raise questions of legitimacy, there are some aspects of local government business that can be strongly influenced by the basis of support available to the council. Intergovernmental negotiations, particularly those between municipalities and the provincial or federal governments, have become a common device for establishing what kind of support (legislative, financial, and administrative) the senior levels of government are willing to provide. If local governments could point to a broad basis of electoral support, they would be in a better bargaining position in such negotiations.

### 3. The Meaning of the Vote

Questions have also been raised about the significance of voting in municipal elections. It is often asked whether the general vote every two years does set

the general direction of local government or whether the powerful lobbies of private interests, the increasing supervision and direction by the provincial government, and the growing complexity of urban issues have robbed municipal elections of any genuine meaning. The debate is not one that can be settled here, but it is of central concern because it questions the validity of the electoral system as a whole.

There are really two separate issues involved, though the two are rarely identified as being distinct. One is how much say we have as the collective electorate, and the other is which of us belong to the electorate. It can be argued that the two aspects have developed in opposing ways. Although the ability of the biennial election to settle major issues of urban policy may have diminished for the reasons mentioned above, this development cannot simply be described as a movement away from the good old days when we all have much more influence over the direction of local government. In the 'good old days', the right to vote was closely tied to the ownership of property, and many people who are now able to cast a ballot were then disenfranchised. The right to have a voice in local government has been extended so that all groups, regardless of their wealth, sex, or ethnic origin, are eligible to speak. However, the impact of elections may be less substantial now than fifty years ago. If this is so, it is both an apparently irreversible feature of modern society and a challenge to the electoral system and those involved in it. The capacity of the electoral system to make major decisions about the life of cities should be improved; but any modifications must be based on a realistic appraisal of the complexity and interdependence of urban areas and of the possibilities provided by improved communications, new mechanisms of citizen participation, and the increasing popular concern about the urban environment. Appropriate improvements cannot be achieved by a nostalgic belief in the form of city government that once existed; its virtues cannot be recreated and its flaws should not be overlooked.



#### SECTION 4: CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES

The issues identified in this section arise either directly from or are implied in the review of the electoral system as set out in the preceding sections. It must be appreciated, though, that the identification of issues also is influenced to some extent by perceptions of what may be considered the objectives of an electoral system. Some of the perceptions that have guided the development of this section stem from the view that an electoral system should facilitate:

- (a) increased citizen participation in the electoral process;
- (b) representation of the diverse interests and lifestyles existing in the community;
- (c) meaningful choice in a system that is simple and intelligible;
- (d) citizen influence in the decision-making process; and
- (e) accountability of the elected representatives to the citizens who elect them.

In addition to the foregoing the task of identifying issues relative to the electoral system has to be guided to some extent by the knowledge of particular problems that have been raised during recent times in Metropolitan Toronto by individual citizens, groups of various kinds, the media and persons who are currently involved directly in municipal government in the area. The issues that have been identified are grouped under the following headings:

- (a) Voter choice;
- (b) Voting and representation
- (c) Role of the elected representative;
- (d) Choice of members of boards and commissions;
- (e) Choosing the members of the Metropolitan Council;
- (f) Choosing the Metropolitan Chairman; and,
- (g) Other issues.



(a) Voter Choice

It has usually been accepted as a principle of any democratic electoral system that the public choice of representatives should be simple, direct and intelligible to the individual voter. However, the system confronting the municipal voter in Metropolitan Toronto is far from intelligible, and is sometimes indirect and exceedingly complex.

Metropolitan Toronto voters exercise their franchise in one of the five Boroughs or in the City of Toronto. Directly elected municipal officers include, in addition to councillors or aldermen who are generally elected on a ward basis, a mayor elected at large, and in three Boroughs, four controllers elected at large, and in one Borough, two controllers elected at large.

In addition the ballot at election time also includes other elective offices for education boards and hydro commissions. The minimum number of elective positions for which the voter must exercise a choice ranges from 5 to 11 depending on the area municipality of residence.<sup>1</sup> Assuming that all offices are contested by at least two candidates voters must make their choices from a total ballot that can contain a minimum of ten and a maximum of twenty-two names. Such a range of choices can only cause bewilderment and confusion for the voter particularly in the absence of any organizing principle at municipal election time in the form of party or programme identification. Thus, an important issue involves the need to make the electoral system more intelligible by reducing the range of choices to a more manageable and meaningful number. The resolution of this issue would seem to require some further assessment of the following:

1. the feasibility of continuing the process of selecting boards of control and the mayor by election at large;
2. the possibility of developing an approach to responsible municipal government by having the executive officers, e.g. board of control or executive committee members and mayor, elected from within the ranks of council;
3. the assumptions underlying the direct election of members of hydro commissions.

An examination of these questions could conceivably yield approaches that might lead to a more intelligible electoral system and one that would be more amenable to voter control.

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1. See Table 13.

To this point, only the direct electoral system has been considered. But there are a number of important activities that are at best, only indirectly influenced by the voter. These are activities that have been assigned to appointed boards and commissions of one kind or another. It has been estimated, for example, that there are more than one hundred local boards and commissions established. While the members of many of these are appointed by municipal councils, there are instances where the appointment of certain members is designated by statute. Despite the fact that many of these bodies exercise considerable influence over public policy in specific areas, the public generally has little information about or any real awareness of their role. This means that the appointment of members to them, where such is the responsibility of council, is rarely subject to public debate or discussion. This, therefore, raises the issue of bringing the responsibilities exercised by many of these bodies more directly under the control of council and therefore more amenable to citizen control.

#### (b) Voting and Representation

From the data included in the first section of this study<sup>1</sup> it is apparent that there is a decline in citizen participation in voting. For example, in percentage terms voter participation in the 1966 elections ranged from a low of 28.9% of eligible voters in North York to a high of 43.28% in East York. In the 1974 election this range had decreased to a low of 27.8% in East York to a high of 30.9% in the City of Toronto. Actually, these percentages understate the extent of decreased voter participation.

For many new residents a municipal election may be their first opportunity to vote for municipal offices and they may be unfamiliar with Borough or City issues. The same may also apply to new residents who have been exposed previously to municipal elections elsewhere in the Province or the country. Given the different bases for election -- at large for the mayor, controllers and hydro commissioners, and a ward basis for councillors and school trustees -- it is difficult for the municipal voter to comprehend their significance, if any.

In the absence of any organizing principle similar to that which prevails in the much more simple system of intelligible choices confronting citizens in provincial or federal elections, the municipal elector is confronted with a bewildering series of choices. On what rational basis can he or she choose among several candidates for the mayoralty, the board of control, councillors, school trustees and hydro commissioners?

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1. See Table 14

The varying sizes of the municipal councils produce considerable variation in the ratio of average population to elected representatives.<sup>1</sup> This ranges from an average population per councillor or alderman of only 13,264 in East York to 38,833 in North York. When all municipal elected councillors are taken into account, including the mayor and controllers (but exclusive of Hydro and school board representatives), the range is from 11,790 in East York to 29,407 in the City of Toronto. Given the fact that the municipalities involved are constituent members of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, it would seem desirable to explore the possibility of obtaining a more uniform ratio of population to elected representative.

### (c) Role of Elected Representatives

Elected representatives have to undertake a variety of roles. Some of these roles are influenced by the different bases of election employed. Thus, for example, the mayors of all of the Boroughs and the City are automatically members of the Metropolitan Council, and where boards of control exist, the controllers are also members of the Metropolitan Council. But in at least two Boroughs an additional number of councillors have to be selected by the council to make up the total allotment of representatives to the Metropolitan Council. Elected representatives who also serve on the Metropolitan Council have two quite distinct roles to play -- one in the local municipality and the other on the Metropolitan Council. However, it is the former that must have priority for it is to the residents of the Borough or the City that the elected representative owes his or her primary allegiance. It is, after all, election in the local municipality that provides the legitimacy of office -- election as a member of the Borough or City Council. The fact that an elected representative may also serve on the Metropolitan Council is more the result of legislative designation than the choice of the electors. (Further discussion of this matter is included in a subsequent part of this section.) The important issue that arises at this stage is the dual responsibility imposed upon many elected representatives.

Further complicating the issue of the role of the elected representative is the obligation frequently imposed to serve as a representative on a number of statutory boards and commissions. Given these conditions the elected representative finds a great deal of his or her time taken up with a variety of time-consuming responsibilities thus making local elective office almost a full-time undertaking. To some extent this situation has provided the justification for the increased

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1. See Table 10.



levels of compensation provided in recent years for service on the local and metropolitan councils.<sup>1</sup> While the twin problems of time demands and the level of compensation undoubtedly deserve further study the more important issue involves an assessment of the extent to which these serve to limit the representative basis of local government in the area. Preliminary data suggests that the great majority of elected representatives are drawn from the ranks of professional, managerial and business groups.<sup>2</sup> This can be interpreted to mean that the values and attitudes of these groups can become the dominant factors in determining particular issues, and the views of many other groups may be unrepresented and unheard. Admittedly, elected representatives drawn largely from the groups indicated do bring skill to their role. Their occupations tend to facilitate their availability. However, these considerations raise the issue of the purpose of the electoral system: Is the role of the individuals selected to represent the diversity of the community or to make their skills available? If the objective is to facilitate the former role then consideration will have to be given to the means of securing wider and more diverse representation that more accurately reflects the diversity of the community. This will also mean an examination of the practices, procedures and constraints of the present system that appear to constitute obstacles to recruitment of candidates on a more representative basis.

(d) Choice of Members of Boards and Commissions

Reference has already been made to the matter of the appointment of members of boards and commissions. Such bodies have generally been assigned responsibility for a particular activity. Their role becomes important when their operations, as is frequently the case, are not subject to the kind of political check that may be expected with respect to the general range of municipal activities. Thus, the appointment of the members of boards and commission can be more important from the point of view of the general public than has generally been accorded to this task, which may be referred to as the "indirect" element in the electoral system. The choice of such members, their values and attitudes and who and what they represent are, from the citizen's point of view, important considerations but are rarely subject to any form of voter influence. In addition, few voters have much information about what various local boards and commissions do, and this also adds to voter confusion.

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1. See Section I.

2. See Table 11.



As the previous section of this study suggests, municipal councils have little discretion regarding the establishment of boards and commissions. Most are mandatory and only a limited number are optional, i.e., established at the discretion of the council. As the legislative review also indicates there is little consistency in the provisions of the various statutes relative to these bodies. Some, but not all, of the variations in these legislative provisions have been summarized below:

1. varying provisions regarding appointment and term of office;
2. different eligibility requirements, e.g., number of councillors vs. non-councillors;
3. inconsistency regarding remuneration for service on boards and commissions; and,
4. variations in statutory provisions as to the general direction that may be exercised by a municipal council over the operations of particular boards and commissions.

The existence of so many boards and commissions or special purpose bodies explains to a considerable extent "the perplexity of the citizen in trying to understand the operation of his municipal government".<sup>1</sup> It is little wonder, then, that the citizen finds it difficult, if not impossible, to affix the responsibility for any lack of effectiveness or performance in the overall operation of his or her municipal government. It is not surprising either that conflicts will frequently occur between a municipal council and a special purpose body over which the former has little or no control.

The principal issue that emerges is the need to consider the effect that the multiplicity of special purpose bodies has on the ability of the citizen to influence and control the direction of his or her municipal government. With regard to this issue some subsidiary questions will need to be examined. These include the following:

1. Would the abolition of many special purpose boards and commissions and the transfer of their responsibilities to the municipal councils facilitate citizen influence and direction and enhance accountability?

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1. K. G. Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961.

2. If the administration of a particular activity seems to require the use of a special purpose body, could not such be established at the discretion of the municipal council under the provisions of a general statute containing consistent provisions relative to the appointment of members, term of office, remuneration, etc.?

While it is appreciated that the matter of special purpose boards and commissions can be approached in terms of structural organization and the criteria of administrative efficiency -- and these are not unimportant considerations -- the question of their accountability to the citizens they serve must also be faced in terms of the issues and the related questions raised above.

(e) Choosing the Members of the Metropolitan Council

To this point discussion has been focussed on the issues emanating from a review of the electoral process in the area municipalities of Metropolitan Toronto. It is, perhaps, natural and almost obligatory to direct attention in this way for the fact of the matter is that the only direct electoral process is that which serves the area municipalities. The selection of the members of the Council of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto is not secured by a similar process of direct representation, but through a procedure that can only be described as generally removed from the direct choice of the electorate.

When a voter in any of the Boroughs or the City enters the polling booth there is no provision on the ballot regarding the choice of representatives to the Metro Council. The choice of the members of the Metropolitan Council is made only indirectly on the basis of decisions made in the polling booth. In fact, many voters are probably unaware that the exercise of their franchise in an area municipality eventually decides the representatives selected for the Metropolitan Council.

The membership of the Metropolitan Council is determined primarily by statutory designation and partly by the decision of some of the area municipalities. Each area municipality has a delegation to the Metropolitan Council of a statutorily determined number.<sup>1</sup> For example, of the 37 members of the Metropolitan Council, exclusive of the Chairman, 31 are statutorily designated. Thus, for example, the 12-member delegation from the City of Toronto is made up of the mayor

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1. See Table 4.

(elected at large) and eleven aldermen. But the Council does not choose the aldermen who will serve on the delegation. These are selected on the basis of the aldermen polling the highest number of votes in each of the eleven 7-member wards. In the Borough of Etobicoke, the 5-member delegation consists of the mayor and the four controllers, all elected at large. However, in the Borough of North York, the 9-member delegation must consist of the mayor and the four controllers, all elected at large. But the Council chooses an additional four aldermen to serve on the delegation.

In these circumstances it may be argued that the voter does have a choice in that he or she chooses the mayor, controllers and aldermen or councillors. However, the voter is only aware that the choice is for representatives to the Council of his area municipality. The ballot does not give the voter any hint that the choice eventually involves Metropolitan Council representation. More importantly, metropolitan issues are rarely raised during an election campaign. This is hardly surprising for the focus of the electoral process is on the choice of the area municipal council. Under the present electoral process it is doubtful if even the most informed and sophisticated individual could be expected to make a meaningful choice for, when casting his or her municipal ballot, the following choices are involved:

- . Mayor -- at large -- for the role of chief executive officer of the area municipality and a member of the delegation to the Metropolitan Council.
- . Controllers -- at large -- four in three area municipalities and two in one other. Chosen as the executive committees of each area municipality and as part of the delegation to the Metropolitan Council.
- . Councillors or aldermen -- on a ward basis. Only in the City of Toronto can the voters actually determine the choice of aldermen to serve on the Metropolitan delegation from the City and this choice is somewhat remote. To influence such a choice the voters must ensure that one alderman in a two-member ward receives more votes than the other.

Given the foregoing method of selecting the Metropolitan Council, it virtually ensures that choice of representatives is somewhat isolated from the political process. In fact, the electoral and representative process, geared to the requirements of the area municipalities, also seems to ensure that metropolitan issues do not relate to the indirect process of selecting the Metropolitan Council. From the point of view of the voter this process appears to suffer from the following difficulties:



1. Metropolitan issues do not play any significant part in the electoral process;
2. Metropolitan Council decision-making is not subject to direct electoral accountability;
3. the Metropolitan Council really reflects area municipality interests and not necessarily the diversity of citizen interests and views existing throughout the metropolitan area;
4. there are few, if any, devices which articulate citizen concerns with metropolitan decision-making and even fewer devices to ensure responsiveness to these concerns; and,
5. the process imposes an impossible dual loyalty on members of the Metropolitan Council and the division of their time and interest between area and metropolitan activity.

(f) Choosing the Metropolitan Chairman

Another issue relevant to the Metropolitan Council concerns the selection of the Chairman. The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act sets out the procedures for selecting the Chairman as follows:

"At the first meeting of the Metropolitan Council in each year after an election at which a quorum is present, the Metropolitan Council shall organize as a council and elect as chairman one of the members of the Metropolitan Council, or any other person, to hold office for that year and the following year and until his successor is elected. . . "1

This Act further provides that "where a member of the council of an area municipality becomes chairman, he shall be deemed to have resigned as a member of such council, and his seat on such council thereby becomes vacant."<sup>2</sup> Thus, the Chairman can be selected from within the membership of the Council or without. If selected via the former route he must resign his seat on the council of the area municipality to which he was elected.

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1. R.S.O. 1970, C.295, s. 5(5) as amended.
  2. Ibid., s. 10(5)



While the present mode for selecting the Metro Chairman means that incumbent of the position has the confidence of Metro Council, in recent years this procedure has been raised in public discussion, frequently in the media. The main point of concern has centred on the fact that the Chairman is not chosen by direct popular election. But the direct popular election of the Metropolitan Chairman in an area as large as Metropolitan Toronto raises even more issues such as:

- (a) the costly nature of the campaign that would have to be waged by aspiring candidates;
- (b) the limitation of the candidates for this office to those who can raise the substantial funds necessary to finance the metro-wide campaigns; and,
- (c) the scale of financial contributions for electoral campaigns that would have to be obtained by candidates resulting in increased public concern with respect to the motives of the contributors.

In addition to the foregoing there are other legitimate grounds for concern with respect to the present position and role of the Chairman of the Metropolitan Council. At present the incumbent of that office is the only member of the Council who can devote his full time and attention to the metropolitan government. It is the potential power implied in this office which is not supported by a direct political constituency that likely underlies periodic outbreaks of public concern with respect to it.

Simply subjecting the office of Chairman alone to direct popular election would hardly result in any significant increase in awareness of metropolitan issues. It is not likely that the diversity and ramifications of these issues can be embodied entirely in the campaigns, conducted over the whole area, for a single office. In many respects, therefore, the issue of the election of the Chairman cannot really be divorced from the much wider issue of the election of the Metropolitan Council.

#### (g) Other Issues

At least two other issues related to the electoral system need to be raised. One of the most important of these relates to the matter of financing electoral campaigns for local elections in the Metropolitan area. Where campaigns have to be conducted over a large territory, e.g., for the mayoralty or board of control, the electoral campaign costs of the candidates are substantial. To meet the cost of such campaigns candidates are likely to have to seek contributions from a variety of sources, thereby raising questions as to the motives of the contributors, particularly

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1. For a more comprehensive treatment of this topic as it relates to provincial elections see Ontario Commission on the Legislature, Report No. 3, Toronto, 1974.

if the amounts are substantial and are derived from a small number of contributors. This issue of campaign financing suggests at least two approaches that need to be considered. These are:

- (a) the enactment of legislation requiring that all candidates publish a statement of electoral campaign expenses together with a complete list of all contributors by name and amount; and,
- (b) the provision of basic campaign expenses from public funds for all candidates for local office.

To some extent the question of election costs is tied to the size of the constituency. Thus, expenses for a campaign for mayoralty or the board of control will undoubtedly require much more substantial financing than the campaign for an aldermanic candidate in a single-member ward or district. This matter is therefore related to the issue raised at the outset in the form of the question: "Is there any real need to continue the process of selecting boards of control and the mayor by election at large?" If the whole process of government in the Toronto metropolitan area is to be made more responsive and more intelligible to the voter, perhaps consideration might be given to putting the whole focus of elections on the basis of single-member wards or districts and allowing the choice of the political executive, i.e., mayor, board of control or executive committee, to be made by the members of the councils elected. It is, after all, a process that is much more in keeping with our own political traditions than the present cumbersome system involving a variety of elective offices on varying bases.

Another issue that needs to be raised is the question of the term of office. While there must be a limit on the term of office, the present requirement of two years is generally regarded as being inadequate to secure any real policy or programme initiation and development. Some consideration should be given to an examination of the merits of a longer term of, say, three or four years.

## A Note on the Legislative Appendices

Eleven appendices follow, which summarize in matrix form the basic legislative framework for the electoral process in Metropolitan Toronto.

While the appendices provide an overview of the relevant public legislation and selected private acts, they do not represent an exhaustive review of all statutes or relevant municipal by-laws. Also certain special purpose bodies have been reviewed more extensively than others.

The reader should note that a blank box in the matrix denotes either the lack of a specific statutory provision, or the existence of a discretionary statutory provision.

























	ESTABLISHMENT	COMPOSITION	TERM OF OFFICE	ELIGIBILITY	RENEWAL/TERMINATION	SELECTION	OTHER LOCAL BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS IDENTIFIED
Committee of Adjustment	<u>R.S.O. 1970, c. 239, s. 41(1)</u> s. 41(1) If a municipal committee of adjustment is established by a resolution of the council of the municipality or by a resolution of the council of adjustment for the municipality.	s. 41(1) ... composed of such persons, not less than three, as the council considers advisable.	s. 41(2) Appointments to the committee shall be for a term of three years, except that on the first appointment the council shall designate members who shall hold office for one year so that as nearly as possible one-third of the members shall retire each year.	s. 41(3) A member of the council of the municipality or of an employee of the municipality or of a local board thereof is not eligible to be a member of a committee of adjustment. (2) In subsection (3) "employee" does not include a teacher employed by a board of education or school board.	s. 41(4) The members of the committee shall be paid such compensation as the council may provide.	s. 41(5) ... the council of the municipality or the council of adjustment and appoint a person to represent the municipality.	OTHER BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS IDENTIFIED 1 Housing Authority 2 City of Toronto Local Divided Housing Corp. 3 Toronto Harbour Commissioners 4 Housing Standards Appeal Committee 5 Toronto Historical Board 6 Mountview Hospital Board of Directors 7 Toronto Redevelopment Advisory Council 8 Committee on Civic Boards of North 9 Advisory Committee for the Retail Gasoline Service Industry 10 Toronto Recycling Committee 11 Bayview Beach Park Board of Management
Community Centres	<u>R.S.O. 1970, c. 239, s. 7(1)</u> s. 7(1) Every community centre established by a municipality shall be under the management and control of a board appointed by the council of the municipality.	s. 7(1) ... and composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council.	s. 7(2) The members of the board shall be appointed annually by the council.	s. 7(3) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 7(4) The members of a board shall serve without remuneration, but they shall be reimbursed by the board for proper travelling and other expenses incurred in carrying out their duties as members of the board.	s. 7(5) Every community centre established by a municipality under this Act shall be under the management and control of a board appointed by the council of the municipality.	7 Toronto Redevelopment Advisory Council 8 Committee on Civic Boards of North 9 Advisory Committee for the Retail Gasoline Service Industry 10 Toronto Recycling Committee 11 Bayview Beach Park Board of Management
Library Board	<u>R.S.O. 1970, c. 239, s. 11(1)</u> s. 11(1) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	s. 11(2) The board of directors shall be composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council.	s. 11(3) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(4) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(5) The members of a board shall serve without remuneration, but they shall be reimbursed by the board for proper travelling and other expenses incurred in carrying out their duties as members of the board.	s. 11(6) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	11 Bayview Beach Park Board of Management
Public Library Board	<u>R.S.O. 1970, c. 239, s. 11(1)</u> s. 11(1) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	s. 11(2) The board of directors shall be composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council.	s. 11(3) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(4) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(5) The members of a board shall serve without remuneration, but they shall be reimbursed by the board for proper travelling and other expenses incurred in carrying out their duties as members of the board.	s. 11(6) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	11 Bayview Beach Park Board of Management
Revision	<u>R.S.O. 1970, c. 239, s. 11(1)</u> s. 11(1) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	s. 11(2) The board of directors shall be composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council.	s. 11(3) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(4) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(5) The members of a board shall serve without remuneration, but they shall be reimbursed by the board for proper travelling and other expenses incurred in carrying out their duties as members of the board.	s. 11(6) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	11 Bayview Beach Park Board of Management
Board of Education	<u>R.S.O. 1970, c. 239, s. 11(1)</u> s. 11(1) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	s. 11(2) The board of directors shall be composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council.	s. 11(3) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(4) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(5) The members of a board shall serve without remuneration, but they shall be reimbursed by the board for proper travelling and other expenses incurred in carrying out their duties as members of the board.	s. 11(6) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	11 Bayview Beach Park Board of Management
Planning Board	<u>R.S.O. 1970, c. 239, s. 11(1)</u> s. 11(1) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	s. 11(2) The board of directors shall be composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council.	s. 11(3) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(4) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(5) The members of a board shall serve without remuneration, but they shall be reimbursed by the board for proper travelling and other expenses incurred in carrying out their duties as members of the board.	s. 11(6) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	11 Bayview Beach Park Board of Management
Parking Authority	<u>R.S.O. 1970, c. 239, s. 11(1)</u> s. 11(1) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	s. 11(2) The board of directors shall be composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council.	s. 11(3) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(4) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(5) The members of a board shall serve without remuneration, but they shall be reimbursed by the board for proper travelling and other expenses incurred in carrying out their duties as members of the board.	s. 11(6) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	11 Bayview Beach Park Board of Management
Board of Health	<u>R.S.O. 1970, c. 239, s. 11(1)</u> s. 11(1) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	s. 11(2) The board of directors shall be composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council.	s. 11(3) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(4) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(5) The members of a board shall serve without remuneration, but they shall be reimbursed by the board for proper travelling and other expenses incurred in carrying out their duties as members of the board.	s. 11(6) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	11 Bayview Beach Park Board of Management
Toronto Electric Commission	<u>R.S.O. 1970, c. 239, s. 11(1)</u> s. 11(1) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	s. 11(2) The board of directors shall be composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council.	s. 11(3) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(4) Each member appointed by the council shall hold office for two years and each member appointed by the council shall hold office until his successor is appointed.	s. 11(5) The members of a board shall serve without remuneration, but they shall be reimbursed by the board for proper travelling and other expenses incurred in carrying out their duties as members of the board.	s. 11(6) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library, and may by by-law appoint a board of directors to manage and control the library.	11 Bayview Beach Park Board of Management









ESTABLISHMENT	COMPOSITION	TERM OF OFFICE	ELIGIBILITY	REIMBURSEMENT	SELECTION	OTHER LOCAL BODIES IDENTIFIED
Committee of Adjustment	2.41(1) ... composed of such persons ... not less than three, as the council considers advisable.	2.41(1) Appointments to the committee shall be for a term of one year, except that on the first appointment the council shall designate members who shall hold office.	2.41(2) A member of the council of the municipality or an employee of the municipality or of a local board thereof is not eligible to be a member of the committee.	2.41(3) The members of the committee shall be paid such remuneration as the council may determine.	2.41(4) The council of the municipality may by-law constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the municipality...	
Community Centre	2.71(1) ... and composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council...	2.71(2) The members of the board shall be appointed annually by the council.	2.71(3) ... where the board is composed of ... or more members, at least two shall be members of the council.	2.71(4) ... shall be elected by the council.	2.71(5) ... established by a municipality or a local board shall be under the management and control of the council of the municipality.	1. East York Cofarvale Park Board 2. East York Curling Rinks Board 3. Leslie Memorial Community Gardens Board 4. East York Safety Council 5. Historical and Arts Board
Board of Health	THE PUBLIC HEALTH ACT, R.S.O. 1970, c. 281, s. 2(1) A health unit consisting of a municipality or town, established by a by-law of the council of the municipality...	Regulation 711, Revised Regulations of Ontario, 1970, under the Public Health Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 281, s. 2(1) The council of the municipality shall constitute a board of health consisting of not fewer members as follows: (a) One member to be appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. (b) Six members to be appointed annually by the Municipal Council of the Borough of East York.	Regulation 711, R.S.O. 1970, under the Public Health Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 281, s. 2(1) This section shall apply to the council of a local board who is appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. (2) A provincial member shall hold office for a term of three years.	2.31(7) One or more members of the council may be appointed to be members of the local board.	2.31(8) One member appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. Six members to be appointed annually by the Municipal Council of the Borough of East York.	
Public Library Board	2.32(1) The board of a public library shall be composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council...	2.32(2) The members of the board shall be appointed annually by the council.	2.32(3) Each member appointed to the board of a public library shall hold office for three years and each member appointed by a separate school board shall hold office for two years...	2.32(4) Each member appointed to the board of a public library shall hold office for three years and each member appointed by a separate school board shall hold office for two years...	2.32(5) The members of the board shall be appointed by the council, three of whom shall be appointed by the public school board or boards of education having jurisdiction in the municipality, and two members appointed by the separate school board, if any, for the municipality.	
Board of Education	2.33(1) On and after the first day of January, 1970, there shall be a board of education for each area of the municipality, to be known respectively as...	2.33(2) The members of the board of education shall be elected by the council of the municipality...	2.33(3) The members of the board of education shall hold office for three years and each member appointed by a separate school board shall hold office for two years...	2.33(4) The members of the board of education shall hold office for three years and each member appointed by a separate school board shall hold office for two years...	2.33(5) The members of the board of education shall hold office for three years and each member appointed by a separate school board shall hold office for two years...	
Planning Board	2.34(1) The council of the designated municipality shall appoint the planning board of a planning area...	2.34(2) The members of the planning board shall be appointed by the council of the designated municipality...	2.34(3) The members of the planning board shall be appointed by the council of the designated municipality...	2.34(4) The members of the planning board shall be appointed by the council of the designated municipality...	2.34(5) The members of the planning board shall be appointed by the council of the designated municipality...	
Commission	2.35(1) The council of the designated municipality shall appoint the commission of a commission area...	2.35(2) The members of the commission shall be appointed by the council of the designated municipality...	2.35(3) The members of the commission shall be appointed by the council of the designated municipality...	2.35(4) The members of the commission shall be appointed by the council of the designated municipality...	2.35(5) The members of the commission shall be appointed by the council of the designated municipality...	



ESTABLISHMENT	COMPOSITION	TERM OF OFFICE	ELIGIBILITY	REIMBURSEMENT	SELECTION	OTHER LOCAL BODIES IDENTIFIED
Committee of Adjustment	<p>8.4(1) ... composed of three persons, not less than three, and one of whom shall be a member of the council.</p> <p>8.4(2) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	<p>8.4(1) ... the committee shall be for a term of three years, and the members shall be appointed annually by the council.</p> <p>8.4(2) ... the committee shall be for a term of three years, and the members shall be appointed annually by the council.</p>	<p>8.4(1) ... the council of the municipality or an employee of the municipality or a local board thereof is not eligible to be a member of a committee of adjustment.</p> <p>(2) In subsection (1) "employee" does not include a teacher employed by a board of education or school board.</p>	<p>8.4(1) ... the committee shall be paid such remuneration as the council may provide.</p>	<p>8.4(1) ... the council of the municipality may by by-law constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	
Community Centre	<p>8.7(1) Every community centre established by a municipality under this Act shall be under the management and control of a board.</p>	<p>8.7(2) The members of the board shall be appointed annually by the council.</p>	<p>8.7(3) ... is composed of five or more members, at least two shall be persons of the council.</p> <p>8.7(4) ... board composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council.</p>	<p>8.7(5) The members of the board shall be appointed annually by the council.</p>	<p>8.7(6) ... the council of the municipality may by by-law constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	<p>1. Environmental Control Committee</p> <p>2. North York Recreation Committee</p> <p>3. The Municipality of North York, R.S.O. 1970 c. 284 s. 359</p> <p>4. Civic Centre Committee</p> <p>5. Personnel &amp; Employee Safety Committee</p> <p>6. Utilization of Community Facilities Committee</p>
Public Library Board	<p>PUBLIC LIBRARIES ACT, R.S.O. 1970 c. 281</p> <p>8.1(1) The council of a municipality may, by-law, establish a public library.</p> <p>8.2(1) Every public library shall be under the management and control of a board, which is a corporation under the name of the (insert name of municipality) Public Library Board.</p>	<p>8.1(1) The board of an urban public library having a population of 10,000 or more shall be composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council.</p> <p>8.1(2) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	<p>8.1(3) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p> <p>8.1(4) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	<p>8.1(5) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p> <p>8.1(6) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	<p>8.1(7) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p> <p>8.1(8) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	
Court of Revision	<p>8.1(1) The court of revision shall consist of three or five members appointed by the council of the municipality and such members other than members of the council may be paid such remuneration and expenses as the council may, by-law, provide.</p>	<p>8.1(2) The court of revision shall consist of three or five members.</p>	<p>8.1(3) Every such member shall be a person eligible to be elected as a member of the council or shall be a member of the council.</p>	<p>8.1(4) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	<p>8.1(5) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	
Board of Education	<p>8.1(1) ... On and after the first day of January, 1967, there shall be a board of education for each area of the municipality.</p> <p>8.1(2) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	<p>8.1(3) The number of members to be elected by public electors to the boards of education, shall be for each of the area in the municipality.</p>	<p>8.1(4) The members of such boards of education shall hold office for a two-year term and until their successors are elected or appointed and a new board organized.</p>	<p>8.1(5) An employee of a board of education in the Metropolitan area or of the School Board is not eligible to be a member of the board of education in the Metropolitan area.</p>	<p>8.1(6) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	
Planning Board	<p>8.1(1) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p> <p>8.1(2) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	<p>8.1(3) The number of members to be elected by public electors to the boards of education, shall be for each of the area in the municipality.</p>	<p>8.1(4) The members of such boards of education shall hold office for a two-year term and until their successors are elected or appointed and a new board organized.</p>	<p>8.1(5) An employee of a board of education in the Metropolitan area or of the School Board is not eligible to be a member of the board of education in the Metropolitan area.</p>	<p>8.1(6) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	
Health Board	<p>8.1(1) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p> <p>8.1(2) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	<p>8.1(3) The number of members to be elected by public electors to the boards of education, shall be for each of the area in the municipality.</p>	<p>8.1(4) The members of such boards of education shall hold office for a two-year term and until their successors are elected or appointed and a new board organized.</p>	<p>8.1(5) An employee of a board of education in the Metropolitan area or of the School Board is not eligible to be a member of the board of education in the Metropolitan area.</p>	<p>8.1(6) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	
Property Standards Committee	<p>8.1(1) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p> <p>8.1(2) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	<p>8.1(3) The number of members to be elected by public electors to the boards of education, shall be for each of the area in the municipality.</p>	<p>8.1(4) The members of such boards of education shall hold office for a two-year term and until their successors are elected or appointed and a new board organized.</p>	<p>8.1(5) An employee of a board of education in the Metropolitan area or of the School Board is not eligible to be a member of the board of education in the Metropolitan area.</p>	<p>8.1(6) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	
Hydro-Electric Power Commission	<p>8.1(1) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p> <p>8.1(2) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	<p>8.1(3) The number of members to be elected by public electors to the boards of education, shall be for each of the area in the municipality.</p>	<p>8.1(4) The members of such boards of education shall hold office for a two-year term and until their successors are elected or appointed and a new board organized.</p>	<p>8.1(5) An employee of a board of education in the Metropolitan area or of the School Board is not eligible to be a member of the board of education in the Metropolitan area.</p>	<p>8.1(6) ... the council may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting the boundaries of the municipality.</p>	





ESTABLISHMENT	COMPOSITION	TERM OF OFFICE	ELIGIBILITY	MEMORANDUM	SELECTION	OTHER LOCAL BODIES IDENTIFIED
<b>Committee of Adjustment</b>	<b>THE PLANNING ACT, R.S.O. 1970, c. 314</b> s.41(1) If a municipality has a committee of adjustment under section 35 or a predecessor of that committee, the council of the municipality may, by resolution, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the municipality...	s.41(1) ...composed of such number of members as the council considers advisable. s.41(2) ...the council shall designate members who shall hold office...	s.41(1) Appointments to the committee shall be for a term of three years, except that on the first appointment the council shall designate members who shall hold office...	s.41(1) A member of the council of the municipality or an employee of the municipality or of a local board thereof is not eligible to be a member of a committee of adjustment. (2) In subsection (1) "employee" does not include a teacher employed by a board of education or school board.	s.41(1) ...the council of the municipality may by by-law constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the municipality...	
<b>Community Boards</b>	<b>THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, R.S.O. 1970, c. 243</b> s.7(1) Every community board established by a municipality under this Act shall be under the management and control of a board.	s.7(1) ...and composed of not fewer than three persons who shall be appointed or elected as members of the board. The board shall be composed of five or more persons, of whom there shall be at least one person who shall be a member of the council.	s.7(1) The members of the board shall be appointed annually by the council.	s.7(1) ...board composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council.	s.7(1) ...the council of the municipality may by by-law establish a community board under this Act shall be under the management and control of a board appointed by the council of the municipality...	
<b>Public Library</b>	<b>PUBLIC LIBRARIES ACT, R.S.O. 1970, c. 243</b> s.1(1) The council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library.	s.1(1) ...the council of a municipality may by by-law establish a public library. The board shall be under the management and control of a board, which is a corporation under the name of "The [name of municipality] Public Library Board."	s.1(1) Each member appointed by a council, public school board or local education board shall hold office for three years and each member appointed by a separate school board shall hold office for two years...	s.1(1) A person is qualified to be appointed as a member of a board if: (a) is a Canadian citizen; (b) is of the full age of eighteen years; (c) is resident in a municipality for which the board is established; (d) is not a member of any one of the bodies entitled to take an appointment to board...	s.1(1) ...the council of the municipality may by by-law establish a public library. The board shall be under the management and control of a board, which is a corporation under the name of "The [name of municipality] Public Library Board."	
<b>Court of Revision</b>	<b>THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, R.S.O. 1970, c. 243</b> s.42(1) The court of revision shall consist of three or five members appointed by the council of the municipality and such members other than members of the council may be paid such remuneration and expenses as the council may by by-law provide.	s.42(1) The court of revision shall consist of three or five members.	s.42(1) The court of revision shall consist of three or five members.	s.42(1) ...and such members other than members of the council may be paid such remuneration and expenses as the council may by by-law provide.	s.42(1) The court of revision shall consist of three or five members appointed by the council of the municipality.	
<b>Board of Education</b>	<b>THE EDUCATION ACT, R.S.O. 1970, c. 243</b> s.1(1) There shall be a board of education for each area of a municipality, to be known respectively as:	s.1(1) The members of the board to be elected by public school electors to the boards of education. (b) For each of the area municipalities shall be one in each ward of the area municipality.	s.1(1) The members of the board of education shall hold office for a two-year term and until their successors are elected or appointed and a new board organized.	s.1(1) A person is qualified to be a member of a board of education in the metropolitan area or of a school board if: (a) is a Canadian citizen; (b) is of the full age of eighteen years; (c) is resident in a municipality for which the board is established; (d) is not a member of any one of the bodies entitled to take an appointment to board...	s.1(1) The members of the board to be elected by public school electors.	
<b>Planning Board</b>	<b>THE PLANNING ACT, R.S.O. 1970, c. 314</b> s.3(1) The Treasurer, upon application of the council of a municipality, or upon his own initiative, may define and name a planning area. s.3(2) The council of the designated municipality shall appoint the planning board of a planning area.	s.3(1) ...shall consist of: (a) one member of the council of the municipality; (b) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (c) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (d) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (e) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (f) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (g) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (h) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (i) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (j) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (k) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (l) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (m) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (n) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (o) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (p) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (q) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (r) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (s) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (t) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (u) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (v) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (w) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (x) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (y) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality; (z) one member of the council of the municipality who is a member of the council of the municipality;	s.3(1) When a member of a planning board becomes a member of municipal council, he ceases to be a member of the planning board, but is eligible to be appointed annually.	s.3(1) A planning board may provide for the payment of salaries, expenses or allowances for the members thereof and shall include its financial statement in its annual report to its committee under section 8.	s.3(1) The council of the designated municipality shall appoint the planning board of a planning area.	
<b>Board of Health</b>	<b>THE PUBLIC HEALTH ACT, R.S.O. 1970, c. 243</b> s.13(1) There shall be a board of health for each area of a municipality in Ontario having a health officer established under this Act.	s.13(1) In a city and in every town having a population of 4,000 or more according to the enumeration of the assessors for the last preceding year, the local board shall consist of the mayor and four resident ratepayers to be appointed annually by the council at its first meeting in every year.	s.13(1) In a city and in every town having a population of 4,000 or more according to the enumeration of the assessors for the last preceding year, the local board shall consist of the mayor and four resident ratepayers to be appointed annually by the council at its first meeting in every year.	s.13(1) One or more members of the council may be appointed to be members of the local board.	s.13(1) In a city and in every town having a population of 4,000 or more according to the enumeration of the assessors for the last preceding year, the local board shall consist of the mayor and four resident ratepayers to be appointed annually by the council at its first meeting in every year.	
<b>Property Standards Committee</b>	<b>THE PLANNING ACT, R.S.O. 1970, c. 314</b> s.3(1) If, on an official plan that contains provisions relating to property conditions in a designated area of the municipality, the council of the municipality, by by-law, may by by-law provide for the establishment of a property standards committee.	s.3(1) ...composed of such number of ratepayers in the designated area as the council considers advisable.	s.3(1) ...and who shall hold office for such term and on such conditions as may be prescribed in the by-law...	s.3(1) A member of the council of the municipality or an employee of the municipality or of a local board thereof is not eligible to be a member of a committee, but a teacher employed by a board of education or school board is not deemed to be an "employee"...	s.3(1) ...the council of the municipality, when a vacancy occurs in the membership of the committee shall forthwith fill the vacancy.	
<b>Public Utilities</b>	<b>THE PUBLIC UTILITIES ACT, R.S.O. 1970, c. 243</b> s.3(1) ...the council of a municipality corporation that owns or operates works for the production, manufacture or supply of any public utility, and the council of a township, the has entered into contract with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario for a supply of electrical power or energy...	s.3(1) ...shall consist of three or five members as may be provided by the by-law, of whom the head of the council shall be one as of right.	s.3(1) ...the council of a municipality corporation that owns or operates works for the production, manufacture or supply of any public utility, and the council of a township, the has entered into contract with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario for a supply of electrical power or energy...	s.3(1) ...the council of a municipality corporation that owns or operates works for the production, manufacture or supply of any public utility, and the council of a township, the has entered into contract with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario for a supply of electrical power or energy...	s.3(1) ...the council of a municipality corporation that owns or operates works for the production, manufacture or supply of any public utility, and the council of a township, the has entered into contract with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario for a supply of electrical power or energy...	



	ESTABLISHMENT	COMPOSITION	TERM OF OFFICE	ELIGIBILITY	REIMBURSEMENT	SELECTION	OTHER LOCAL BODIES IDENTIFIED
Committee of Adjustment	<b>THE PLANNING ACT, R.S.O. 1970 c. 315</b> s.41(1) If a municipality has three or more wards, the council of the municipality may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the municipality...	s.41(1) ...and composed of such persons as the council considers advisable.	s.41(1) Appointments to the committee shall be for a term of three years, except that on the first appointment the council shall designate members who shall hold office...	s.41(1) ...and composed of such persons as the council considers advisable.	s.41(1) The members of the committee shall be paid such remuneration as the council may provide.	s.41(1) ...the council of the municipality may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the municipality...	1. Borough of York Housing Co. Ltd. 2. Borough of York Safety Council
Community Centres	<b>THE COMMUNITY CENTRES ACT, R.S.O. 1970 c. 21</b> s.9(1) Every community centre established by a municipality under this Act shall be under the management and control of a board...	s.7(1) ...and composed of not fewer than three persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the council...	s.7(2) The members of the board shall be appointed annually by the council.	s.7(1) ...and composed of five or more persons, at least two shall be members of the council...	s.41(1) The members of the committee shall be paid such remuneration as the council may provide.	s.11(1) Every community centre established by a municipality under this Act shall be under the management and control of a board appointed by the council of the municipality...	3. Historical Committee
Boards of Management	<b>THE PLANNING ACT, R.S.O. 1970 c. 315</b> s.31(1) The council of a municipality may, by-law, establish a public library, and every public library shall be under the management and control of a board...	s.31(1) The board of an urban municipality having a population of 15,000 or more shall be composed of five or more persons, at least two shall be members of the council...	s.31(1) Each member appointed by a council public school board or board of education shall hold office for two years and every member shall continue to hold office until his successor is appointed.	s.41(1) A person is qualified to be a member of a board if (a) he is a Canadian citizen; (b) he is at the full age of majority; (c) he is resident in a municipality in which the board is established; and (d) he is not a member of any one of the bodies entitled to have an appointment to Board...	s.41(1) The members of a board shall serve without remuneration, but they shall be reimbursed by the board for expenses incurred in carrying out their duties as members of the board.	s.31(1) ...three members appointed by council, three members appointed by the public school board or board of education having jurisdiction in the municipality, and two members appointed by the separate school board, if any, for the municipality.	
Public Library	<b>THE PLANNING ACT, R.S.O. 1970 c. 315</b> s.31(1) The council of a municipality may, by-law, establish a public library, and every public library shall be under the management and control of a board...	s.31(1) The board of an urban municipality having a population of 15,000 or more shall be composed of five or more persons, at least two shall be members of the council...	s.31(1) Each member appointed by a council public school board or board of education shall hold office for two years and every member shall continue to hold office until his successor is appointed.	s.41(1) A person is qualified to be a member of a board if (a) he is a Canadian citizen; (b) he is at the full age of majority; (c) he is resident in a municipality in which the board is established; and (d) he is not a member of any one of the bodies entitled to have an appointment to Board...	s.41(1) The members of a board shall serve without remuneration, but they shall be reimbursed by the board for expenses incurred in carrying out their duties as members of the board.	s.31(1) ...three members appointed by council, three members appointed by the public school board or board of education having jurisdiction in the municipality, and two members appointed by the separate school board, if any, for the municipality.	
Board	<b>THE PLANNING ACT, R.S.O. 1970 c. 315</b> s.31(1) The council of a municipality may, by-law, establish a public library, and every public library shall be under the management and control of a board...	s.31(1) The board of an urban municipality having a population of 15,000 or more shall be composed of five or more persons, at least two shall be members of the council...	s.31(1) Each member appointed by a council public school board or board of education shall hold office for two years and every member shall continue to hold office until his successor is appointed.	s.41(1) A person is qualified to be a member of a board if (a) he is a Canadian citizen; (b) he is at the full age of majority; (c) he is resident in a municipality in which the board is established; and (d) he is not a member of any one of the bodies entitled to have an appointment to Board...	s.41(1) The members of a board shall serve without remuneration, but they shall be reimbursed by the board for expenses incurred in carrying out their duties as members of the board.	s.31(1) ...three members appointed by council, three members appointed by the public school board or board of education having jurisdiction in the municipality, and two members appointed by the separate school board, if any, for the municipality.	
Court of Revision	<b>THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, R.S.O. 1970 c. 21</b> s.43(1) The court of revision shall consist of three or five members appointed by the council of the municipality and such members other than members of the council may be paid such remuneration and expenses as the council may by-law provide.	s.43(1) The court of revision shall consist of three or five members appointed by the council of the municipality and such members other than members of the council may be paid such remuneration and expenses as the council may by-law provide.	s.43(1) The court of revision shall consist of three or five members appointed by the council of the municipality and such members other than members of the council may be paid such remuneration and expenses as the council may by-law provide.	s.43(1) The court of revision shall consist of three or five members appointed by the council of the municipality and such members other than members of the council may be paid such remuneration and expenses as the council may by-law provide.	s.43(1) The court of revision shall consist of three or five members appointed by the council of the municipality and such members other than members of the council may be paid such remuneration and expenses as the council may by-law provide.	s.43(1) The court of revision shall consist of three or five members appointed by the council of the municipality and such members other than members of the council may be paid such remuneration and expenses as the council may by-law provide.	Boards of Management pursuant to the Community Centres Act R.S.O. 1970 c. 21
Board of Education	<b>THE MUNICIPALITY ACT, R.S.O. 1970 c. 315</b> s.116(1) On and after the first day of January, 1967, there shall be a board of education for each area municipality, to be known respectively...	s.116(2) The number of members to be elected by public school electors to the boards of education, shall be one municipality shall be one municipality...	s.116(2) The number of members to be elected by public school electors to the boards of education, shall be one municipality shall be one municipality...	s.116(2) The number of members to be elected by public school electors to the boards of education, shall be one municipality shall be one municipality...	s.116(2) The number of members to be elected by public school electors to the boards of education, shall be one municipality shall be one municipality...	s.116(2) The number of members to be elected by public school electors to the boards of education, shall be one municipality shall be one municipality...	1. Urban Healthcare Community Centres Board 2. Borough of York Community Centres Board
Planning Board	<b>THE PLANNING ACT, R.S.O. 1970 c. 315</b> s.31(1) The council of a municipality may, by-law, establish a public library, and every public library shall be under the management and control of a board...	s.31(1) The board of an urban municipality having a population of 15,000 or more shall be composed of five or more persons, at least two shall be members of the council...	s.31(1) Each member appointed by a council public school board or board of education shall hold office for two years and every member shall continue to hold office until his successor is appointed.	s.41(1) A person is qualified to be a member of a board if (a) he is a Canadian citizen; (b) he is at the full age of majority; (c) he is resident in a municipality in which the board is established; and (d) he is not a member of any one of the bodies entitled to have an appointment to Board...	s.41(1) The members of a board shall serve without remuneration, but they shall be reimbursed by the board for expenses incurred in carrying out their duties as members of the board.	s.31(1) ...three members appointed by council, three members appointed by the public school board or board of education having jurisdiction in the municipality, and two members appointed by the separate school board, if any, for the municipality.	
Parking Authority	<b>MUNICIPAL ACT, R.S.O. 1970 c. 315</b> s.312 By-law may be passed by the council of all municipalities...	s.312 By-law may be passed by the council of all municipalities...	s.312 By-law may be passed by the council of all municipalities...	s.312 By-law may be passed by the council of all municipalities...	s.312 By-law may be passed by the council of all municipalities...	s.312 By-law may be passed by the council of all municipalities...	
Housing Standards Committee	<b>THE PLANNING ACT, R.S.O. 1970 c. 315</b> s.36(1) If a municipality has three or more wards, the council of the municipality may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the municipality...	s.36(1) ...and composed of such persons as the council considers advisable.	s.36(1) Appointments to the committee shall be for a term of three years, except that on the first appointment the council shall designate members who shall hold office...	s.36(1) ...and composed of such persons as the council considers advisable.	s.36(1) The members of the committee shall be paid such remuneration as the council may provide.	s.36(1) ...the council of the municipality may, by-law, constitute and appoint a committee of adjustment for the municipality...	
Board of Health	<b>THE PUBLIC HEALTH ACT, R.S.O. 1970 c. 315</b> s.13(1) There shall be a local board of health in every municipality in Ontario established under this Act.	s.13(1) In a city and in every town having a population of 4,000 or over according to the enumeration of the assessors for the last preceding year, the local board shall consist of the mayor and four resident taxpayers to be appointed annually by the council at its first meeting in every year.	s.13(1) In a city and in every town having a population of 4,000 or over according to the enumeration of the assessors for the last preceding year, the local board shall consist of the mayor and four resident taxpayers to be appointed annually by the council at its first meeting in every year.	s.13(1) In a city and in every town having a population of 4,000 or over according to the enumeration of the assessors for the last preceding year, the local board shall consist of the mayor and four resident taxpayers to be appointed annually by the council at its first meeting in every year.	s.13(1) In a city and in every town having a population of 4,000 or over according to the enumeration of the assessors for the last preceding year, the local board shall consist of the mayor and four resident taxpayers to be appointed annually by the council at its first meeting in every year.	s.13(1) In a city and in every town having a population of 4,000 or over according to the enumeration of the assessors for the last preceding year, the local board shall consist of the mayor and four resident taxpayers to be appointed annually by the council at its first meeting in every year.	





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ON METROPOLITAN TORONTO**

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